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ABSTRACT
DEVELOPING A METHODOLOGY TO DETECT 
PARTIAL FAILURES FOR DYNAMIC SYSTEMS
Anwar A. Al-jowder 
Old Dominion University, 2003 
Director: Dr. Resit Unal
The purpose of this research is to develop a decision support system that can 
assist in detecting partial failures in dynamic systems such as Fire Control System 
Tracking Radar (TR) onboard Naval Ships. Partial failures do not necessarily shut down 
the system immediately but cause degradation of operational performance. Previous work 
has shown that experts in the field of failure detection, test point insertion and Built-In- 
Test Equipment (BITE) can provide useful input in detecting partial failures. Partial 
failures affect operational system performance and support costs, which can be 
significant. Often, however, partial failure detection consists of the estimations and 
opinions of the experts. This has not been addressed adequately in the literature. It is 
postulated that the approach developed in this research could be applied to maintain and 
monitor partial failure. The development of such a testing aid is the thrust of this research 
effort. Markov chains, k-out-of-n: G: system and critical path tracing techniques, among 
others are employed. Appropriate survey questionnaires are used for validation of the 
resulting test model. Application of previous test point insertion techniques are applied as 
a part of system comparison and assessment.
Co-Director of Advisory Committee: Dr. Andres Sousa-Poza
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1CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION
1.1. Problem Background
The operation and maintenance of complex and dynamic systems onboard naval 
ships involves challenging operational problems due to its complex electromechanical 
units and sophisticated monitoring and control devices. One of the problems during 
operation is the occurrence of partial failures that do not necessarily shutdown the system 
immediately. Partial failures may occur for a variety of reasons such as:
• Hardware problems or software problems or both, such as wear and tear of 
equipment components,
• Fault signals from electronics boards or false operational signals from 
safety trip systems,
• Sudden perturbation of voltage or current,
• Incomplete or incorrect maintenance of the equipment,
• Wrong action by operator, bad training, and
• Different system environmental conditions, etc.
The journal model o f  Journal o f  Applied physics  was used.
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Problems of this type can shutdown a system, and it can take from a few hours to 
a few days to restore the systems to their full operating condition, depending on the 
nature of the problem. In restoring the system to operational condition, a major objective 
is to avoid failure by taking all possible maintenance measures.
On failure of a subsystem, most systems onboard ships that have Built-in-Test 
Equipment (BITE) switch to a diagnostic mode and internally isolate and identify or 
predict the failed part(s) using a go or no-go procedure. This procedure itself can produce 
failures, because some of failure recovery using BITE requires switching the system on 
and off, and may result in reduction of system performance and reliability. Additionally, 
it is critical that the BITE has reliability in orders of magnitude greater than the system it 
is supporting; otherwise, the added complexity may reduce system reliability.
An inaccurate BITE can introduce complications in differentiating between a real 
false alarm and an accurate alarm. Researchers in this field believe that decreasing the 
number of connections between any system and its BITE equipment should reduce 
system weight and the probability of the system faults induced by BITE. However, this 
action of reducing the connection between the system and its BITE leads to an increase in 
the time required for diagnosis realization and checkout (Smith, 2001).
1.1.1. Tracking System Boundary, Limitation and Delimitation.
When problems arise, systems like a Fire Control System-Tracking Radar (TR), 
with automated elements and continuous functions, require a proper identification
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
3boundary. The TR system boundary actually depends on which equipment is going to be 
involved in a specific situation or moment to complete a system operation cycle. 
Therefore, when a problem arises in the TR, the confines of the problem and its elements 
need to be identified, and all inputs and outputs must be known at that specific moment.
If one assumes involvement of human factor elements as negligible in these types 
of systems, it is possible to consider that all complete and partial failures under this 
condition are treated as hardware problems only. Figure 1 shows the TR system 
Hierarchy diagram.
1.1.2. Research Hypotheses.
In this research, it is hypothesized that partial failures induced onboard Naval 
Ships can be detected by inserting observation test points in electronic Naval systems. 
Furthermore, one can use experts’ judgment to determine an appropriate place for test 
point insertion.
Usually this type of partial failure, when it occurs, does not propagate to the 
system primary output, or, in other words, cannot be detected by an external test point, 
and does not shutdown the system. For example, figure 2 demonstrates the effect of three 
partial failures generated in a system during its normal operation without causing this 
system to shutdown, or without propagating to the system primary output. These partial 
failures are denoted as 1, 2, and 3 respectively. Any changes in system performance 
(calculated in percentage) under influence of these three partial failures over time are
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
shown as two horizontal and dotted lines denoted as 100% for perfect operation and 0% 
as shutdown.
However, at the time those partial failures occur no action is carried out by the 
BITE. This means that all of those failures did not propagate to the system primary 
output. This is an indication that the system test patterns, which were estimated by the 
experts for the BITE, were not sufficiently high failure coverage. As a result there was no 
failure detection by BITE or an immediate system shutdown.
The BITE action time area in figure 2 presents the time correction required by 
BITE to isolate and correct the failure. So, if the question is asked, “What is the 
difference between the three failures?” the answer is that the first partial failure was 
induced as soon as the system was switched on without causing any effect on the system 
operation. In reality, system performance is technically already reduced because of this 
partial failure. Moreover, BITE could not even recognize the failure until the system 
enters a shutdown state due to the spreading of the problem. In the second and third 
failures, both occurred and the system did not reach the 100% performance.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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Figure 1. Tracking Radar System Hierarchy Diagram 
The BITE action in failures two and three are the same as for the first failure. The 
problem, therefore, is how can one detect this type of failure without interrupting system 
operation. This research hypothesizes that a proper system organization of observation 
point insertions can detect and monitor partial failures, and can be utilized to minimize 
these types of failures. In addition to minimizing partial failure by using proper 
observation point insertions, an improvement of the system’s availability can be 
achieved. This, in turn, can lead to improvements in maintenance, performance and cost.
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6three different partial failure types
System
performance
Time of action
Figure 2. The Effect of Partial Failures Generated in a System During Normal 
Operation
1.1.3. System Evaluation
This research develops a decision aid that can assist in the detection of a partial failure 
from a maintenance perspective before it propagates through the system. This is 
accomplished by developing, selecting and monitoring observation points on the system 
being studied, using a methodology that combines three techniques:
1. The Multi-State k-out-of-n: G: System,
2. The Markovian T echnique,
3. The Critical Path Trace Technique.
This research effort requires two sources of information. Available data is the first 
resource, and expert opinion the second. Available data includes field data and scheduled
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
7maintenance data. Use of expert judgment is necessary when good, or well-organized, 
historical data is not available. An expert judgment data acquisition approach is utilized 
in this research, in parallel with the three above mentioned techniques to develop a 
decision support system that can assist in detection and monitoring of partial failures in 
fire control system of a TR. Expert elicitation is accomplished using questionnaires, 
which were also used to validate the research results.
1.1.4. Important Definitions and Assumptions
In this research, “subsystem ” refers to a piece of equipment or portion of a 
system, which can be viewed as an independent entity for evaluation in the detection of 
partial failures. “System ” refers to an orderly arrangement of components that interact 
among themselves, with external components, and other systems to perform an intended 
function. “Dynamic System” refers to any operational system under continuous use, with 
continuous state changes. The state changes are dependent on orders received from 
hardware or software commands. “Challenged system” refers to component elements of 
multidisciplinary systems that do not involve human factors. The “test point” is said to 
provide a solution for failure if this specific test point enables the required and specific 
failure to be detected.
1.2. Research Objective
The primary objective of this research is to test the hypothesized points, which are 
known to detect partial failures. These hypotheses consist of two points.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
81. Observation test points to detect partial failures in electronic Naval 
systems, which are not detected by BITE, are inserted, and,
2. by using use experts’ judgment to determine appropriate place for test 
point insertion.
A decision aid support system based on maintenance decisions can be developed 
that can support and manage maintenance with BITE(s) to monitor and predict dynamic 
system partial failures before they significantly damage the system or its subsystems.
The specific technical objective is to identify and test a feasible approach using 
the combined methodologies of the multi-state k-out-of-n: G: system, the Markov 
technique, and observation point insertion using a critical path tracing technique to 
increase the system reliability and maintainability as a decision aid. This provides the 
capability to select the appropriate procedure to maintain these types of dynamic systems.
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CHAPTER II 
LITERATURE REVIEW
The aim of this literature review is to scan earlier studies related to undetected 
partial failures in dynamic systems that do not cause immediate system failure but yet 
reduce system performance and availability. There is a significant body of research and 
publications in the area related to complete systems failures and their effects. Little 
research, however, has been carried out on partial failures, their effect on reliability, 
availability and on how to detect them.
Most of the research reviewed assumes that any operational system has only two 
states: failure and operation. Only a few researchers addressed a system under the 
assumption of more than two states i.e.: partial failures, partial work (Lewis, 1994; 
Ebeling, 1996; T. A. Cruse, S. Mahadrevan, 1994).
In addition to earlier studies, this literature review gathers current research and 
frames the current research topic within the context of this overall body of knowledge. 
The literature review will summarize research on partial failures and recovered an 
approach to detect partial failure based on literature search results.
This literature review includes the following sections: 1) Failure Definitions and 
Related Topics, 2) k-out-of-n: G/F: Systems, 3) Architecture and Stress Influence, 4) Test 
Point Arrangements, 5) Previous Work in Test Point Insertion, 6) Built in Test 
Equipment, and 7) Specialist Judgment Elicitation.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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2.1. Failure Definitions and Related Topics
There are many research papers on failure related topics, i.e., failure rate, failure 
repair, failure frequency, etc.; however, there appear to be only a few specific research 
papers and texts available on failure classification, definitions, and types. Rausand (2001) 
classified the failures as shown in figure 3. He positioned partial failure under extended 
failures, and then he divided the partial failures into two categories; sudden failure and 
gradual failure. The category depends on the system reaction and performance to the 
failure.
iBfsffluttert Extended
Mure
Complete
failure
Partial
failure
Sudden
failure
Degraded
Failure
Gradual
failure failure
Figure 3. Rausand (2000) Failure Classification
Comer and Angstadt (2001) studied the failure modes and identified complete 
failure as 100% loss of one or more function, while partial failures as degraded or partial 
loss of one or more function. They concluded that it is difficult to identify the complete 
list of fundamental failure modes, and to determine whether a failure mode is fail-danger, 
or fail-safe. Generally, it is a function of the process (initiation based on an increasing or
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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decreasing signal) and its design (on-off versus modulating signal, de-energized versus 
energized to initiate, ect.). Table-1 displays the general component failure modes that 
were determined following the functional analysis of component input/output loops 
(Comer and Angstadt, 2001).
Complete Failure Partial Failure
© Control Output >100%
© Control Output Frozen 
© Control Output <0%
© Process Variable fodication>l(H)% 
© Process Variable indication Frozen 
e  Process Variable Indication <0%
© Control Output fedtcaion > 100%
© Control Output Micatiort Frozen 
©. Control Output Indication <0%
© False Discrete Judication 
© Alarm Fail to Function 
© Alarm Spuriously Function 
© Interlock Fail to Function 
* Interlock Spuriously Function
© Control Output High 
© Control Output Low 
© Control Output Slow to Respond 
© Control Output Too Fast 
© Control Output Erratic 
© Auto Controller in Manual Mode 
© Process Variable Indication High 
© Process Variable Indication Low 
© Process Variable Indication Erratic 
© Control Output Indication High 
© Control Output Indication Low 
© Control Output Indication Erratic 
© Alarm Function Delayed 
© Interlock Functions Early 
© Interlock Function Delayed 
© Interlock voting channel fail to function 
© Interlock voting channel spuriously 
function
Table 1. General Component Failure Modes
Yellman (1999) addresses failure and its general terms, which can legitimately 
apply to an unsatisfactory output of an item from any cause, to an unsatisfactory output 
caused by an internal condition, or to an unsatisfactory memory state. Yellman (1999) 
emphasized that distinctions among these types of failures should be made by preceding 
the word failure with an appropriate adjective and not by creating definitions for failure 
itself, which are impractical and unnecessarily narrow. A paper by R. Rees (1997)
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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addresses what a failure is, and what the different issues are in relation to the failure. 
Rees’ work clarifies one of the main issues in this research: the requirement to understand 
the meaning of defect, malfunction, failure, and fault terms that merely include and 
exclude failure by type, cause, and degree of use. For example, Rees stated that failure is 
a “matter of function only.” He also found that neither hardware nor software should ever 
be described as “failed,” but rather as being or having been “in a condition that can be 
associated with functional failure.” One can agree with Rees that failure should not 
necessarily mean that “something is broken,” but one also can argue that failure does not 
necessarily mean that something has actually functioned unsatisfactorily. So, what 
exactly is a function? Most engineers define function as a purpose of an item 
(Smith.2001). If one were to attempt to determine how much failure impacts the system 
function, output reliability performance would also have to be one of the focal points of 
this research.
Generally, few technicians can distinguish between meanings of the word 
“failure.” Yellman (1999), for example, stated, “...The failure dichotomy lies in clearly 
distinguishing between two types of events. 1.) Functional failure: unsatisfactory 
performance (e.g., an item delivering unsatisfactory output) occurring during a process 
such as operation or testing. 2.) Material failure: An undesired physical condition (e.g., an 
internal part of an item being damaged or broken), which is also permanent (i.e., it will 
persist until it is repaired). Such a condition could exist during operation or testing.” 
Additionally, Rees (1997) and Shedletsky and McClusky (1975) differ from Yellman’s 
(1999) statement by adding the condition that “... at the time there is no demand on an 
item to function at all.”
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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Failure as error latency is a final issue to be discussed in this section. The 
definition of error latency of a fault is the number of random input vectors applied to a 
circuit until the fault is detected at one of its primary outputs. The meaning of circuit in 
this research can be extended to cover a larger combination, or sequence of circuits, 
which can be treated as whole component(s), or even system(s). Shedletsky and 
McCluskey (1975) present error latency as a random variable assuming values from the 
set of positive integers, and say its value depends on the circuit and the fault in question. 
Their assumption, which was used to enhance our model, considers also that any fault is 
nothing but a complete test set of affected and unaffected subsets. The affected subset is 
the collection of all input vectors that detect the fault, and the unaffected subset of the 
remaining input vectors are the ones that do not detect the faults.
2.2. k-out-of-n: G: Systems Technique in Relation to Failure
Several researchers studied the reliability model based on different failure modes 
(failure modes were defined and determined in relation to system component 
configuration and relationship). In analyzing a complex system, a particular failure mode 
may be applied to the entire system. However, an alternative approach is to determine an 
appropriate reliability for each component of the system. This is requiring applying the 
rules of probability according to the configuration of the components within the system 
individually, and then to take the sum, which depends on the components’ configuration 
in the system (Ebeling, 1996). The two primary configurations are series and parallel. 
When the system is connected in series, for example, the only way the system can 
function is when all components are in operation. In a parallel configuration, or the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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redundancy case, at least one component must function for the system to function. 
However, many research papers and texts have studied the use of the k-out-of-n: G 
system approach to calculate the reliability and availability, but only with the assumption 
that the system has only two states, binary zero as a failure state, and binary one as a 
success state (Lio, 1998; Angus, 1988; Scheuer, 1988). A k-out-of-n: G system means 
that an n component system works if and only if at least k components work or do not 
fail. This can be explained more easily by looking to series and parallel systems as 
special cases of the k-out-of-n: G systems, i.e., a series system is n-out-of-n: G; and a 
parallel system is 1-out-of-n: G.
Scheuer (1988) studied the reliability of k-of-n: systems where component failure 
induces higher failure rate in the survivors. He assumed that the components are 
independent and identical components (i.i.d) with constant failure rates. Shao and 
Lamberson (1991) modeled the reliability and availability of an n-unit shared load 
repairable k-out-of-n: G system with imperfect switching, in which i.i.d components with 
constant failure rates were considered. Hasset (1995) investigated the reliability and 
availability of repairable l-out-of-2: G systems composed of 2 s-identical components 
with varying failure rates. Liu (1998) developed a model to calculate the reliability of a 
sharing k-out-of-n: G system, which is composed of independent non-identical 
components (non-iid) and arbitrary failure time distribution. This assumption, in Lio’s 
opinion, is more general and realistic than the model with i.i.d components with 
exponential failure time distributions.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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However, before the dynamic system reaches its failure state (shut down), it must 
give some type of symptom(s), either immediate and fast output results or graded and 
slow output results. These output results depend on three factors: the components’ status 
state and system configuration, and the components’ resistance to handle the failure 
stress. These results are a series of partial failures of different stress magnitudes induced 
before the system is forced to stop due to complete failure. Causes of failure are due to 
external or internal factors or both, i.e., aging, corrosion, bad maintenance or operation, 
high voltage or current, or environment.
In reality, to represent any system status state one must have more flexible tools 
such as a multi-state system model that can represent all states individually in relation to 
components states. Huang and Zuo (2000) demonstrated this flexibility in dealing with a 
multi-state system model, where they present the system relationship with its components 
in such a way that the system can not be in any state required level unless a minimum of 
k of its components (operating ones) are on the same state level.
2.3. Architecture and Stress Influence
In many research papers of k-out-of-n: G: systems, stress was named as a major 
failure factor. The nature of the stresses that trigger the failure mechanism can be 
electrical, mechanical, thermal, chemical, or radioactive (Smith, 2001). The types of 
stresses, which represent diverse physical phenomena, are point stresses, diffused 
stresses, and treating stresses (Ebeling. 1996). Stress distribution among system 
components should be in equilibrium in relation to the components’ configuration and
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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their distributions. One of the key factors in equipment engineering design is the design 
safety factor margin, sometimes called the safety factor. The safety factor is defined as 
the ratio of the resistance of the system to the stress placed on the system (Ross. 1970; 
Lewis, 1994; Ebeling, 1996; Haidar and S. Mahadervan, 2000; Smith, 2001). Most 
previous research that applied stress on their models to study system reliability and 
availability did so without considering the failure action process. During the application 
of the stress on equipment, they missed the observation of system failure behavior. 
System behavior under the influence of failure can behave differently depending on the 
process along which failure progresses, which may be a direct or indirect indication, as 
has been explained in an earlier section.
Zahalca and Chardi (1996) studied system configurations from the perspective of 
their sensitivity to the stress influence. Their demonstration shows that, with an increased 
number of components in a series configuration, lower stress sensitivity can be developed 
on the system components. Furthermore, for any system with five or fewer components 
in parallel configuration, induction shows greater sensitivity to the stress than a series 
configuration does.
Zahalca and Chardi (1996) assumed that the stress process is a homogenous 
Poisson process. Their results show that in any system subject to a common 
homogeneous Poisson stress process, the failure rate is constant or increasing and 
converges rapidly to a constant. This demonstration confirms that the most reliable 
configuration is most sensitive to stress. On the other hand, it can be conjectured that the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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reliability and the stress sensitivity increases in the same order, so, the more reliable a 
configuration is, the more stress-sensitive it will be.
2.4. Test Point Arrangements.
Many military standards and texts specify test points (Smith, 2001) in relation to 
system performance verification and diagnosis. MIL-STD1765 gives wide explanation on 
test points, which are characterized into three factors: safeties, sensitivity, and protection. 
With this characterization, the test points are defined for both electrical and mechanical 
systems under the requirements of their performance verification and diagnostic.
MIL-STD-1765 defines the test points under two categories: standard functional 
and maintenance. Functional test points are those points which are available in external 
connectors by virtue of normal input/output (I/O) signal transfer. The maintenance test 
points are those points which are available in external maintenance connectors to 
supplement functional test points, as required, to accomplish performance verification 
and diagnostic testing. However, this does not exclude maintenance test points being 
available in functional connectors. Now, for example, when there is a failure of any 
equipment in a system, the failure will be isolated by the BITE (if the system has one). 
Then the BITE shifts to next step, which is a go or no-go test that will tell if the 
diagnostic reading is available in the connectors that are external to each individual 
component. This operation between BITE and test point arrangement in monitoring the 
dynamic system is going to be improved.
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2.5. Previous Work on Test Point Insertion
Krishnamurthy (1987) showed that the optimal test point placement for a dynamic 
system by re-convergent fan out is a complete failure recovery. Briers and Toton (1986) 
were the first to propose a systematic method for test point placement to increase pseudo­
random pattern testability. They use simulation statistics to identify correlations between 
signals, and then insert test points to break the correlation. The number of test points 
inserted by this method is large. Youssef (1993) used the critical path testability measures 
to guide the placement of test points. Youssef (1993) identifies sectors of hard-to-detect 
faults and inserts test points at the origin. Cheng (1995) enhanced the procedure proposed 
by previous researchers by using a cost function, which is based on the critical path 
testability measures, in linear time, the gradient of the function with respect to each 
possible test point. The gradients are used to approximate the global testability impact for 
inserting a particular test point. Based on these approximations, a test point is inserted 
and the critical path of testability measures is recomputed. This process is iterated until 
the testability is satisfactory. Massoud, Armita, and Navabi (2000) proposed a method in 
which a failure was induced in the circuit and a test applied to detect the failure. This is
the opposite of the fault simulation proposed by (Cheng, 1995), in which a fault is
*
inserted in the circuit and various tests are applied until one is found to detect the fault.
2.6. Built in Test Equipment
The duty of the BITE is to detect, identify, and isolate failure from the system 
during the failure diagnosis. There are two types of BITE: concurrent and nonconcurrent. 
The concurrent BITE is an off-line test of either structural or functional integrity. The
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nonconcurrent one is defined as an on-line test using either information redundancy or 
hardware redundancy or both. Using BITE can eliminate the cost of test pattern 
generation and fault simulation, shortening the time duration of the test, simplifying the 
external test equipment, and simplifying the adoption of the engineering changes (Paul H. 
Bardell, W. H. McAnney, and J. Savir, 1987).
Generally, there is no one best BITE structure. BITE is a collection of 
possibilities, the choice of which depends upon the application. The factors to consider 
include fault coverage required, the system overhead, which is tolerable, the system 
performance and the performance impact of the BITE technique, and the socket or test 
time, which is allowed. Some of the BITE structures modeling techniques are Scan-path, 
the random test socket, simultaneous self-test... etc. For more detail about type of BITE 
structures and their functions, see Paul H. Bardell, W. H. McAnney, and J. Savir (1987).
2.7. Expert Judgment Elicitation
2.7.1. Overview
This research utilizes expert judgment methodology in using observation points to 
monitor and detect partial failures. The field of expert judgment elicitation is generally 
accompanied with decision sciences that include how uncertainty in decision-making can 
be eliminated or minimized. Most literature considers that the main premise of the study 
of decision science is that ultimately humans are responsible for making and 
implementing decisions, either directly or through the use of surrogate algorithms and 
simulations (Hogarth, 1982, and Burge, 2001). There are many methods and models for
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analyzing decisions and designing strategies for implementing them. Each seeks to 
augment or supplement human abilities in some manner.
Salo(2002) defines decision-making for a partial system failure as “ ...an event 
with unknown outcome.” Therefore, it is sensible at the time of modeling and analysis in 
engineering to start with the employment of safety factors using deterministic analysis, 
followed by probabilistic analysis with reliability-based safety factors (Ayyub, 2001).
In eliciting the expert’s judgment for decision-making, it is required to select 
appropriate and direct methods of elicitation that involve direct questioning of the domain 
expert on how they do their work and how they can give information to improve it. 
Hugarth (1982) stated,
“[...] Questioning is a form of communication between people in which a 
questioner tries to elicit information from a respondent. Questioners seek a particular 
kind of information and try to convey that desire through the questioning process. For 
adequate communication to take place, the respondent must understand the meaning of 
questions. At the same time, the questioner must understand the meaning of the response 
and judge whether it is a satisfactory answer to the question. Speaking the same language 
is a necessary but not sufficient condition for this communication process to take place.”
The above statement shows that there are three main points to be considered in 
developing questionnaires eliciting expert judgment and opinion: understanding the 
meaning of the question, understanding the response and judgment, and speaking the 
same language. Belson (1968) suggested a technique for the pre-tested phase whereby 
responders are asked to repeat their understanding of the meaning of the question in their 
own words. This technique is analogous to back translating, when questions are translated 
into another language. On the basis of his use of this technique, Belson (1968) concludes
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pessimistically that even with well-developed, simplified questionnaires, many 
respondents do not understand the question as the researcher intended.
Expert judgments are the expressions of informed opinion, based on knowledge 
and experience, given in response to a technical problem. Thus, expert judgment can and 
legitimately should change over time as the expert receives new information, which can 
be then utilized to predict future events (Morey, 2000).
2.7.2. Definition and Meaning of Specialist/or an Expert
Conway (2003) stated that, “expert performance is vital to any analysis using 
expertise. If internal and external environment requirements exist for assessing the 
accuracy of expert judgment, the evaluation is straightforward. However, environment 
requirement standards rarely exist in domains requiring expertise, which is why experts 
exist in the first place”. The first requirement is, therefore, to determine who is an expert. 
Many researchers have defined the meaning of expert. For example Conway (2003) 
defines experts by expanding Morey’s (2000) expression as “individuals who have 
background in the subject area and are recognized as such by their peers as qualified to 
address the technical problems”. Also, Ayyub (2001) emphasizes that an expert is 
someone who has had much training and has knowledge in some special field. These are 
rather generalized definitions and often insufficient in determining appropriate 
individuals to elicit for expert opinion. (Chytka et. al, 2003) address this, stating, “a 
pinpoint definition is required to fully comprehend the degree and type of knowledge 
necessary to qualify an individual as an expert. Currently, one of the widely utilized
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methods is peer identification, which seems to be capable of expressing expert 
identification. Professionals are asked whom they would consider to be an expert. When 
there is some agreement on the identity of such individuals, then they are labeled to have 
expertise. ” Chytka et. al (2003) follows the same expression of expert judgment as 
Shanteau (2000).
Expertise is not just possessing knowledge or having qualifications; it is a highly 
specialized set of skills that have been honed in a particular situation for a specific 
purpose (Morgan and Henrion 2001; Shanteau, 2000; Jackson 1999). As such, being an 
expert is quite distinct from having an education. Experts need to know more than just 
the mere facts or principles of a domain in order to solve problems. Experts need to 
know which kinds of information are relevant to which kinds of judgments, how reliable 
different information sources are, and how to make hard problems easier by dividing 
them into smaller, more manageable units. Eliciting this type of knowledge, which is 
normally based on personal experience rather than formal training, is difficult (Jackson 
1999).
2.7.3. Studies in Expert Elicitation
Knowledge elicitation studies and methods are classified in many ways to obtain 
the information required to solve problems. One of the common ways relies on how 
directly solicitors obtain information from the domain expert (Burge, 2001). Directly 
obtained information involves questioning a domain expert on how they do their work. 
Burge (2001) classifies these methods by the ways they interact with the domain expert.
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Others, like Hudlicka (1997), classify knowledge elicitation by what type of information 
is obtained.
2.7.4. Knowledge Elicitation Methods
As stated previously, knowledge elicitation methods have been classified in many ways 
(Burge, 2001). One common way is by how directly information is obtained from the 
domain expert. Direct methods involve directly questioning a domain expert on how they 
do their work (Hogarth, 1982). Burge (2001) found that in order for these methods to be 
successful, the domain expert has to be reasonably articulate and willing to share 
information. The information has to be easily expressed by the expert, which is often 
difficult when tasks performed by the expert have become 'automatic' or internalized. 
Indirect methods are used in order to obtain information that cannot be easily expressed 
directly (Hudlicka, 1997).
2.7. Literature Review Summary
Table 2 below summarizes the main points in the literature review. Ted W. 
Yellman (1999) emphasized that distinguishing among failure terms should be done by 
preceding the word failure with an appropriate adjective and not by creating definitions 
for failure itself, which are impractical and unnecessarily narrow. In other words, during 
partial failure, satisfactory and unsatisfactory system output indicates different meaning. 
This is because system output depends on the combination of system functions and 
performance cycles in the case of the occurrence of partial failure. Yellman’s (1999) 
conclusion can enhance current research where more than two states are assumed i.e. a 
partial failure state. Rausand (2000) classifies failure in relation to complete failures and
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partial failures. This classification is used in current research to distinguish between 
complete and partial failure, and to simplify this distinction. Table 2 expresses the 
meaning between complete and partial failures, and Zuo (2000), who studied systems and 
their components (subsystems), stated, “both the system and its components can have 
more than two states, e.g., completely working, partially working, partially failed, 
completely failed.” Algorithms for reliability evaluation of such systems are presented. 
Huang’s and Zuo’s (2000) work is potentially useful in developing a test methodology. 
Stress can be involved in inducing and spreading the partial failures from the defective 
component to neighboring components. Cruse and Mahadreven (1994) studied the 
influence of stress, and they concluded that the noncritical failures in a defective 
component cause a distributed stress on non-defective components. In current research, 
an observation test point can provide a possibility for monitoring partial failures, which 
are indicated by Cruse and Mahadreven (1994) as noncritical failures.
Zahalca and Chardi (1996) conclude that system sensitivity increases with the 
number of components in a series configuration, which is less sensitive than parallel 
configuration. This study also confirms that the most reliable configuration is most 
sensitive to stress. In current research, system confirmation with respect to test point 
insertion can be utilized by looking to the components with parallel configurations more 
carefully than series configurations. This is a key motivator for the present study. Ebeling 
(1996) enhanced the assumption of partial failure states when he stated that “[...] a 
component having a constant failure rate has slightly better than one-third chance of
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surviving to its mean time to failure,” which means that the system can pass through 
more than one partial state before reaching complete failure.
An early study on using critical path tracing to detect failures was presented by 
Premachandran and Aramvici (1991). They proposed and developed a modification 
algorithm of the critical path tracing method to make it exact for combinational circuits. 
Based on critical path tracing, Shadfar, Paymandoust and Navabi (2000) used fault 
simulation to detect faults. Their method applied a fault test to a circuit, and detected 
faults were reported. This is different from the other methods in which a fault is inserted 
in the circuit and various tests are applied until one is found to detect the fault. In this 
research, our intention is to minimize the number of observation test points to only 
parallel system (circuit) configurations. Touda and McCluskey (1996) introduced test 
pattern procedures. They proposed detection of complete failure coverage using critical 
path tracing by using test patterns.
A further approach to the determination of partial failure involves the use of 
experts, who are relied upon to provide knowledge related to the failure process and 
outcomes. Morey (2000) defined experts based on knowledge and experience. As is 
known, there is no boundary for knowledge. As a result, no single methodology exists. 
Therefore, building knowledge about any system requires the use of questionnaires. 
Additionally, based on the literature review, qualitative assessments are easier to elicit 
than probabilities. Hugarth (1982) gives a more specific expert definition and the criteria
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needed to be developed to select subject matter experts. Afati (2002) defines uncertainty 
for decision-making as an event with an unknown outcome.
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A uthors) M ajor Points/Finding C urrent R esearch/ Research
Implication®
Yellman (1999) “Satisfactory” and
“Unsatisfactory” system output 
in relation to failures.
Enhance current research
Rausand (2001) Classified the failure in relation 
to complete failures and partial 
failures
Use as a baseline to differentiate 
between the complete and partial 
failures
Huang, Zuo (2000) The system and it is components 
can have more than one states
Potentially useful in developing 
Test Methodology
Cruse and Mahadrevan (1994) “Stress influence”
Noncritical failures in a defective 
component cause a distributed 
stress on non-defective 
components
Stress clear feedback can be used 
to minimize the stress on non­
defective components
Zahalca and Chardi (1996) “System  Sensitivity” increases 
with the number o f  components 
in a series configuration, which is 
less sensitive than parallel 
configuration
A  key motivator for present study
Ebeling (1996) Mean Time To Failure in 
Constant Failure rate system has 
better than one-third chance o f  
components surviving
Enhance the assumption o f  partial 
failure states.
Menon and Aramovici (1991) “From Pessimistic to optimistic 
results” An early study on using 
critical path tracing to detect 
failures
A  key motivator for present study
Shadfar, Paymandoust, and 
Navabi (2000)
Detected faults using fault 
simulation based on critical path 
tracing.
Critical path tracing techniques 
used in parallel configuration to 
detect and monitor partial failures 
that cause system  degrading.
Touba and McCluskey (1996) A  complete failure coverage 
using critical path tracing using 
test patterns.
Selected test patterns to cover 
maximum partial failure
Meyer (2000) Elicitation o f  experts based on 
knowledge and experience.
Building knowledge about any 
system require use o f  
questionnaires
Hugarth (1982) Gives more specific expert 
definition
A  key motivator for present 
study.
Salo (2002) Defines decision-making for a 
partial failures state as a 
unknown system outcome
Enhance the assumption o f  partial 
failure states.
Table 2. Literature Review Summary
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2.9. Research Problem
Based on the literature summary, this research will address partial failures in 
operating systems such as fire control tracking radar onboard naval ships. When these 
types of partial failures occur in such systems, they lead to challenging operational 
problems. Consequently, minimizing or eliminating these types of failures can improve 
system performance and reduce maintenance cost.
2.10. Research Purpose
The purpose of this research is to develop a methodology to detect partial failure 
in fire control system tracking radar. Early detection of partial failures can improve 
performance and reduce repair costs. Two main steps are to be used to detect partial 
failures. The first is by inserting observation test points to detect partial failures in 
electronic naval systems not detected by BITE. The second is by relying on the experts’ 
judgment to determine the appropriate place for test point insertion. The expert judgment 
generated result will be used to validate the first approach which is based on the three 
techniques. The expected findings of the research for the system under study can improve 
system performance, aid in decision-making, and reduce overall repair time.
2.11. Contributions
The literature review yielded important observations on partial and complete 
system failures. The first observation is that most of the researchers have concluded that 
all complete failures are induced as a chain of partial failure states. This is true, but when 
researchers estimate operating systems as a set of only two-status states, they increased
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uncertainty in detection of complete and partial failures. This is because the probability 
for all the system status states is not considered. Moreover, as a result of two-status 
states, estimation by BITE systems may not provide sufficiently high fault coverage. This 
occurs especially when there is a large system network that contains many partial failures 
(which can lead to complete system failure), where the BITE detection system can easily 
ignore these types of failures. By testing and adjusting the arrangement between the 
system performance, reliability and monitoring test point insertions, one can control and 
optimize the detection and monitoring of partial failures. An important contribution of 
this study is to illustrate a new kind of decision-making, which has potential for 
applications other than on naval ships.
The second observation is that from previous experiments and knowledge, 
researchers estimate two sets of states that consist of either operating state or non­
operating state. This action of state estimation covers system function failures only and 
not failures that occur in system performance, which includes partial failures. In such 
cases, a different approach is required because in addition to detecting system function 
failures, one is required to detect maximum system performance failures. This can be 
achieved by inserting test points in the appropriate complete failure recovery critical path 
to monitor and control failure. By doing so, maximum monitoring, and control coverage 
is obtained for every specified set of test points, which in turn increases the system’s 
performance and availability.
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This research also serves to develop a practical tool for tactical and operational 
decision-making that may be adopted as a standard approach in decision-making 
processes that involve maintenance investment. At this time, there is no existing model 
that addresses all the relevant issues to solve this problem. The usefulness of this study’s 
findings is not limited to supporting the BITE for dynamic systems. It can also be used to 
generate recommendations for fundamental applications at organizations that support 
ship/shipyard maintenance in predicting (i.e., as field observers) small production 
problems, which do not shut down the system but can create operational problems later 
through partial failures.
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CHAPTER III 
RESEARCH OBJECTIVE
3.1. Primary Objective
The primary objective of this research is to test if a model can be developed to 
determine the insertion of observation test points to detect partial failures in electronic 
naval systems not detected by BITE. The model is based on k-of-n: G system, Markovian 
Chain technique, and critical path tracing. For validation, expert judgment is used to 
determine whether the predicted insertion points are appropriate. This model should 
improve decision-making on maintenance that will support and manage BITE(s) to 
monitor and predict dynamic system partial failures before they significantly damage the 
system or its subsystems.
3.2. Model Description Using The Three Techniques
In operation, dynamic systems change their states continuously in relation to 
functional required at a specific moment. This means that each stated movement of the 
system requires a specific number of system components to function as required correctly 
so that the system can change its current state to the next state. In this research, system 
states are going to be defined as the final system state that results from the summation of 
all system components that are required to function at that specific moment. Therefore, 
system states individually can be treated as a final summation output result of the 
combined multi-components ’ final states at a given specific point in time. Figure 4 
demonstrates the above discussion. In this case, each system’s final state depends on
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
32
several factors. Some of those factors are the components’ location in relation to the 
system structure at that specific time, and the stress that is shared by each component.
The components’ final state has a great impact on the system state’s result 
because each system state level requires the same number of components to be at or 
above a certain state (Huang and Zuo, 2000). However, maintaining any system’s state 
may require at least a specific number of components to operate clearly. The required 
number of components depends on the system-state (activity) being considered. In 
conclusion, the relationship between the system’s state and the components’ state is bi­
directional.
^Current Final System-State
Final components state
Component-1 state Comoonent-2 state Comoonent-3 state Comoonent-n statei ii.ii i -  ■ ,m- .1, . ..i a    . a .............. |gl i i    —  D   nfiT ....f  t t t
From Other Components 
Figure 4. Final System State Resulting From a Summation of All System Components
Based on the above description, the model may deal with the components of the 
operating system that are as dynamic in behavior as the multi-state k-out-of-n: G: system- 
states. Also, at the time of system failure or partial failure represented, Markov chain
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techniques can be utilized with the assumption that there are more than two states 
(depending on the system components’ structure and location). The system can consist of 
several types of component configurations: series-series, series-parallel, parallel-series, 
parallel-parallel, or combination thereof. Figure 5 a, b, c, and d demonstrate different 
system configurations operational states.
System state
i k
a) Series-parallel
System state
System state 
/'■" ■ .
L
b) Parallel-series 
System state
c) Series-series d) Parallel-parallel
Figure 5. Different System Configurations Operational States
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Cruse and Mahandevan (1994) differentiate between critical and noncritical failures (or 
failure and/or partial failure) in that critical failures result in immediate, total failure of 
the system, whereas non-critical failures degrade the system performance, resulting in 
changes in external load within the failure context on the components by creating a chain 
of failure events.
Figure 6. Two States Markov Model
Therefore, non-critical failures do not directly result in system failure; instead, the 
degradation caused by their occurrence affect the probability of occurrence of the critical 
failure. Also, Cruse and Mahandevan considered that “.... the distinction between critical 
and noncritical failure modes in their methodology is maintained in the construction of 
the failure tree, by identifying several levels. At level I, the probability of each individual 
failure mode is estimated for an intact system, i.e., no damage has occurred. At level II 
and above, the probabilities of occurrence of the critical failure modes are estimated after 
accounting for the non-critical mode. This is done through reanalysis of the system after 
incorporating the effect of noncritical failure, such as load redistribution and /or changing 
the finite element mesh to show local cracking.” In reality, they proposed a model, which 
can treat each system state as combination levels of components and subcomponents.
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Figure 7. Multi States Markov Proposed Model
3.3. Mathematical Model Description
A system is considered 100% reliable if all its components are operational and 
can be represented by a two-state Markov model as given in Figure 6 , i.e., operation or 
failure. If the system is not 100% reliable, then the components cannot be represented as 
in Figure 6. A more detailed model becomes necessary. A multi-state Markov model may 
be required to include all detailed states of components. For simplicity, a system 
consisting of a single component is considered in this study, as shown in Figure 7. The 
component can have more than two states immediately after “switch on.” In the following 
example four states are assumed:
• The operational state (desired operation performance),
• A non-operational performance state or complete failure, and
• Two partial operational states leading to less than desired operational 
performance, which do not necessarily have the same failures, and do not
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directly result in system failure. However, their occurrences affect the 
probability of occurrence of the non-operational performance event and 
non-operational states (non-operational performance state or complete 
failure).
In this model, each component will have four possibilities to reach the failure state:
1. A direct failure (direct transition from operation state to complete failure state).
2. From operation state to complete failure state after transit from first partial failure.
3. From operation state to complete failure state after transit from second partial 
failure without passing first partial failure to failure state.
4. From operation state to first partial failure state to second failure state then to 
complete failure state.
When a component fails, certain repair work can be performed (either a complete 
repair or replacements repair). It is assumed that complete repair and replacement repair 
restore the failed component to an as-good-as new state. The replacement of a failed 
component by an independent and identical component (i.i.d) can be done via a backup 
system. In order to measure the system’s component performance at any instant of time, 
system availability must be defined at that instant in time. In the general observation to 
predict component availability (A), both the failure and repair probability distributions 
must be considered.
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A = (operation time) /(operation time + Down time) (1)
= (MTBF) /(MTBF + MTTR) (2)
A„= (MTBF) /(MTBF + MDT) (3)
Where,
Ao = operational availability, MTBF = Mean Time Before Failure, MTTR= Main Time 
to Repair, and MDT = Mean Down Time.
Equation (3) is known as the steady-state availability and can be expressed as a ratio or as 
a percentage.
One of the key assumptions in this steady-state model is the assumption of 
constant failure rate and constant repair rates. To expand these assumptions for 
evaluating the availability for interval, or mission (t0 -> tk) where k > 1 is
Atl _ t0= (r/(r +X)) + (X/ ((r +X) 2.(tr  t^ )). [e ("+r) -  e (X+T) n] (4)
Figure 7 shows X\, X'-u and pi, the failure rates and repair rate respectively. Now, with 
steady-state conditions, availability can be calculated as probability. If P\ is the 
availability probability of being in state i, the steady-state equations are
1. -X\P\ - X'\P\-Xi P\+ jxP4 — 0
2 . -X2P2 - X'2P2+ X\P\ = 0
3. -X2P 2 + X%P2 + X'\P\ = 0
4. Pi + P2 + P3 + P4  = 1
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If the component is available in state 1, 2, or 3, the steady- state availability is given by
Pi +P2 + P3 = Availability
Now the probabilities
1. Pi = [ 1 + (AS . [ ((A A) + (Ai. (A + A2))) / (A+ A2)])
+ (A /(A +A 2)) + ((A+ A+ A) / p)]1 
(6)
2. P2=P\. (A /(A+A2))
3. P3 = Pi- AS[ ((A i A) + (A,, (A + A2))) / (A+ A2)]
The Markov model can be extended to address the multi-component system using the 
transition rate, which can be expressed, more conveniently, in the form of a transition
matrix.
P = T'1 b
Where P is the probability, T is the transition matrix, and b is Identity matrix.
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CHAPTER IV 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
4.1 Introduction
The purpose of this research is to develop a methodology to detect partial failure. 
By detecting partial failures early, one can improve performance and save costs. In the 
prior literature, many researchers used probabilistic techniques on designing BITE 
systems that can achieve certain levels of improvement in detecting failures. But still, 
these probabilistic techniques may not provide sufficiently high failure or partial failure 
coverage. The requirement is to provide a support technique to the BITE system. This can 
reduce the time gap between the accruing of partial failures and BITE system reaction, 
which can then imply maximum recovery in the number of failures recorded against 
system availability and performance that then require maintenance actions in order to 
continue the system to full operation and maximum performance. It also underlies the 
same reduction in the time and manpower required maintaining and servicing the system.
From previous experiments of system failure detection, researchers estimate two 
states that consist of either operational state or non-operational state. This type of states 
estimation in reality is going to cover system function failure only and not failure that 
occurred due to system performance, which include degraded failures, among which are 
partial failures. In such cases, a different approach is required to be taken into account to 
have maximum failures recovery for system performance and availability in addition to 
system function. This is can be achieved by inserting observation test points in proper 
selected areas in the system. In doing so, maximum monitor and control failure coverage
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are obtained. Table 3 summarizes the eight phase methodology, which are explained in 
detail in section 4.4.
ffcase Action
1 .Problem  Definition a Performance characteristics selection.
® Define partial failure 
® Identification o f  parameters 
a M odel provides distributions o f  parameters
2.Criteria Selection ® Experts selection
o  Qualification 
o  Knowledge o f  the system  
a Data selection
o  Type and location o f  data (at sea, 
at workshops, etc.) 
a Establish a checklist for specialties
3.Define The Param eters That Cause Partial 
Failure
® Experts can recommend adjustments 
a Parameters weighted
4.Construction and Adm inistration of 
Questionnaire
a Test information built into questionnaire 
a Using confidence type 
a E-mail, card, simple and direct questions
5.Results ® Raw data
6-Revision and Correction •  Expert opinion 
® Changes
7.Qbservation Point Insertion ® Identify the partial failure
•  Selection o f  observation points that enable 
each o f  the partial failures to be identified
•  Selection o f  a minimum set o f  observation 
points that provide partial failure coverage
® Path tracing
•  Probability o f  partial failure detected by  
observation point
8. Validation o f  M ethodology ® Survey and interviews 
•  Follow-up questionnaire 
® Output methodology
® Revision
Table 3. Summaries Methodology Outline
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4.2. Proposed Approach
4.2.1. Development of a Model to Base Maintenance Decisions.
Markov chain, k-out-of-n: G: system, and failure path tracing techniques are 
employed to develop a New Testing Technique (NTT). Based on this technique, 
observation test points are inserted, which may enhance system performance. For this 
research, the NTT is developed in one of the technology areas associated with Tracking 
Radar (TR) Fire Control Systems that are currently installed onboard Bahrain Naval 
Royal Force ships. A simple questionnaire is used to develop a fault detection technique 
to identify failures that are not detected by a specified set of test patterns.
The second part of the questionnaire makes a comparison with the best previous 
results for other test point insertion methods used for that specific system. This is 
achieved with the knowledge obtained from experts in this field. This comparison is used 
to validate the results obtained from the NTT.
The result can then be used for further study to support a fault diagnostics 
procedure or to validate the effectiveness of BITE equipment capability.
4.2.2. Test Validation
The main objective for this study is the development of a model on which to base 
maintenance decisions that can account for support and manage maintenance with BITE 
to monitor and predict dynamic system partial failures before they significantly damage 
the system or its subsystems. Validation is accomplished using a structured expert
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elicitation technique. Experts are solicited using a questionnaire that highlights a series of 
parameters related to test point insertion that impact overall operation for the Fire Control 
System TR. For each parameter, a manufacturing company was asked to indicate the 
impact of the parameter on support requirements of the specific system. Each parameter 
has a series of Fire Control System attributes that may impact that parameter. For each 
attribute, the expert assesses the percent improvement that the attribute has on associated 
parameters.
It is conceivable that with this new approach, maintenance decision-making can 
be improved, thereby enhancing system performance and reducing the cost of the 
technology adopted. This consequence of the NTT model is not folly validated, but 
tentatively investigated using a questionnaire issued to the experts, which assesses a 
comparison between the new and old technology and their impact on the performance 
and cost.
4.2.3. Application of Technique
Officials from the Bahrain Royal Navy and experts from the related company will 
provided feedback on the results. Then the result of ongoing research with the experts’ 
feedback data will be used to increase the effectiveness of TTN in the future.
4.3. Data Needs and Resources
System data is divided into two parts. The first part is designated as the primary 
parameters. Primary parameters are the main factors used to detect failure. This means
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that if the primary parameter is controlled or monitored by observation test points, most 
partial failures can be detected. Some of these parameters could be voltage, current, etc. 
The second part is designated as the secondary parameters. Secondary parameters are 
those that can be affected by the primary parameters due to the controlling or monitoring 
of partial failures (i.e., increase or decrease of mean time to failure, increase or decrease 
of mean time between failure, etc.). Some of these parameters are MTTR, MTTF, and 
MTBF.
Data received from external resources is in two parts. Data received from the 
system manufacturing company, is treated as secondary parameters. This type of data is 
already normalized and is used directly in the research model. Data that is collected from 
the field from similar TR(s) systems is treated as primary parameters. The same 
maintenance group collects this data for the duration of three years from August 1998 to 
July 2002. This data is normalized by the system manufacturing company.
4.4. Partial Failure Detection Phases Methodology
Figure 8 shows the research methodology flow chart, which is developed to detect 
and monitor partial failures of the dynamic system and to improve performance. The 
methodology consists of eight phases and is derived from the study of literature related to 
failure detection by k-out-of -in: G: system, test point insertion and critical path, and 
Markov techniques. The phases from the problem definition to methodology validation 
are described following Figure 8, and in the following sections.
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Figure 8. Partial Failure Research Methodology Phases Flow Chart
4.4.1. Phase 1: Problem Definition
In this phase of the methodology, it Is assumed that the system is already in 
operation with continuous use, and with continuous change states depending on the order
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it receives. The design team, due to a variety of detection approaches, has identified 
partial failures, which can occur without necessarily shutting down the system. The 
design team then selected the critical performance characteristics to be included in the 
system analysis study together with the input parameters whose values are subject to 
change due to partial failure occurrence. The NTT methodology will be utilized to 
identify these partial failures and the possibility to control them.
4.4.2. Phase 2: Criteria Selection
This phase has two parts. The first part is the selection of experts. In this case, 
expertise will have two meanings. The first is general familiarity with fire control system 
tracking radar system design, and the second is specific knowledge of tracking radar 
system operation and maintenance.
The second part of criteria selection is data selection. This part will depend on the 
researcher’s knowledge of the system. Fundamentally, for this methodology, this means 
that if the researcher is one of the expert team involved in the domain of system 
knowledge, the collection of data will be easier. The connection between the selection of 
experts and the selection of data is important in preparing any checklist. Some of the 
criteria expected to be included in the checklist.
© System knowledge
© Technical skill
© Decision strategies
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4.4.3. Phase 3: Determination of Parameters
The fire control system tracking radar is a small, compact system. There are, 
however, many parameters that have a major effect on partial failures. The expert could 
act individually in identifying parameters that are to be included in the analysis. The 
parameters are selected based on their effect on the degradation of system performance 
due to partial failures. Many methods can be utilized to identify parameters and system 
performance characteristics. Some of the methods are: aggregation, correlation, and 
averaging.
4.4.4. Phase 4: Construction and Administration of Questionnaire
The construction of the questionnaire related to new testing techniques starts by 
defining expert opinion with respect to their knowledge of involvement and technical 
skill concerning the system under study. The questionnaire can be categorized under 
three levels: (1) expertise, (2) study, and (3) subject.
Measuring and Reading Elements
To be more effective in data collection, the type of measurement and way of 
reading, if it is specified, can improve queuing of data collection. This action may be 
useful in helping experts to achieve their opinion. An important point is that to be more 
effective; anchoring must be consistent and repetitious, and use identical methods for 
testing a particular response pattern.
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Test Elements
For this research, the NTT is developed for experts in one of the technology areas 
associated with Tracking Radar (TR) of Fire Control Systems that is currently installed 
onboard Bahrain Naval Royal Force ships. A simple questionnaire is used to develop a 
fault detection technique to identify failures by a specified set of test patterns. A second 
part of the questionnaire attempts to make a comparison with the best previous results for 
other test point insertion methods used for that specific system. The questionnaire was 
made available to experts via E-mail, a simple and clear-printed card, and a simple 
example with unambiguous language.
4.4.5. Phase 5: Results
The questionnaire concerning new testing techniques yielded data in the form of 
ship log books, workshop defect books, and E-mails, as well as the raw attribute range 
and confidence level data for judgments on the selected parameters and characteristics.
4.4.6. Phase 6 : Revision and Correction
After collecting data, correction from experts was required, to increase the 
confidence in the analysis. This action serves as feedback to avoid any misunderstanding 
of questions, and allows experts more time to revise their opinion based on the data 
summary.
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4.4.7. Phase 7: Observation Point Insertion
Experts record all the different measurements of the required available 
parameters; potentially this reading could fall more in the estimation-instrumented 
domain than in the real instrumented domain, depending where the measurement was 
held (at sea, in workshops, or along the sea wharf). Consequently, taking the average 
reading of all possible measurements obtained from expert responses to the new testing 
techniques can help to estimate parameters more accurately. As in this technique, the 
intention is to identify partial failures that do not propagate to a higher primary output. In 
other words, the investigation measures more than two status states (including partial 
failure state(s)).
New Testing Technique 
The observation point is an additional primary output that is inserted in the system 
to increase the detection of partial failures in the system, subsystem, or equipment. Partial 
failures that do not shut down the system immediately are the failures that require 
observation test point in addition to the system function point in order to be detected. See 
figure 9 below.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
49
Propagated output
System
Subsystem
A
Equipment
Output level
Input Level
Output level
Input Level
Output level
h m t1 three
Propagated output
Level Tw®
Propagated output
Level one
Input level
Figure 9. Propagation of partial failure using observation points
The New Testing Technique can be simplified in the following steps:
1. Identify the partial failures.
As stated in phase 1, the design team, due to a variety of approaches, identifies 
partial failures, which can occur without necessarily shutting down the system. 
This can be performed for the set of test patterns applied to the system, 
subsystems, or components under investigation to determine which partial failures 
are already undetected and which require observation points in order to be 
detected.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
50
2. Select observation point that enables each of the undetected faults to be detected. 
For each of the partial failures that require observation points, a set of observation 
point solutions is computed such that if any observation point in the set is inserted 
into the system, subsystem, or components, the partial failure will be identified.
3. Select a minimum set of observation points that provides complete failure 
coverage.
Given the set of observation point solutions for each partial failure, a set covering 
procedure is used to find a minimum set of observation points that enable all of 
the partial failures to be detected.
4. Path tracing.
To find the set of observation point solutions for partial failure that was provoked 
by a particular pattern, path tracing can also be used to identify the position that 
the partial failure can propagate.
5. Probability of partial failure detected by observation point.
Any observation point that gives a detection solution to a partial failure will 
satisfy the detection probability state of this partial failure, based on the 
assumption of the multi state Markov model. The probability of partial failures of 
the example in section 3.3.2 was calculated as:
P2 =Pl. ( k l/ ( k 2+k'2))
P ^ P i -  ^ 3[ ((ki k2) + (k'h ( h  + k ’2))) / ( li+  k'2)]
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The assumption was that for two partial states in addition to one operation and 
one complete failure state 
Where,
Pi = the probability of the operation state, P2 = the probability of first partial failure, P3= 
the probability of second partial failure, X' 2  -  failure rate of the first partial state to failure 
state, X'i= failure rate of operation state to the second partial failure, X2 = failure rate first 
partial state to second partial state, X3 = the failure rate from operation state to non­
operation state, and ki=the failure rate from operation state to first partial failure state.
4.4.8. Phase 8: Validation of Methodology
Validation of the methodology in this research means building the right support 
test system: that is checking system performance by continuing to monitor and detect 
partial failure to make sure that the system does what it is supposed to do. Bahill (1991): 
explains this clearly in the statement “[...] Validity refers to the degree to which a study 
accurately reflects or assesses the specific concept that the researcher is attempting to 
measure.”
Many researchers have classified validity into three forms. The first is face 
validity, which is concerned with how a measure or procedure appears. Does it seem like 
a reasonable way to gain the information the researchers are attempting to obtain? Does it 
seem well designed? Does it seem as though it will work reliably? Unlike content 
validity, face validity does not depend on established theories for support (Fink, 1995). 
The second is criterion related validity, also referred to as instrumental validity. It is used 
to demonstrate the accuracy of a measure or procedure by comparing it with another
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measure or procedure, which has been demonstrated to be valid. The third is construct 
validity, which seeks agreement between a theoretical concept and a specific measuring 
device or procedure (Adelman, 1992).
The forms of validation are contingent on the modes of communication. There is 
three well documented modes of communication: face-to-face, telephone, and mail. The 
face-to-face mode works best for obtaining detailed data. It, however, consumes more 
time and is expensive. The second mode uses telephony capabilities, which can be 
substituted for the mail mode only if limited bits of information are being communicated. 
The third mode is the mail mode, which works well for sending and receiving simple data 
from a large sample of experts. When compared with face-to-face surveys, mail surveys 
cost less (Meyer and Booker, 1991).
In this research, the principle mechanisms used to validate the methodology are 
surveys, telephone and E-mail, and indirect interviews in which the expert is interviewed 
alone, with exchange of the data between the researcher and experts. This process of 
expert judgment testing will give the opportunity to provide feedback on the usefulness, 
ease and applicability of the testing process. Additionally, face validity was used to 
validate the methodology to ensure that the questionnaire is measuring what it is 
supposed to be measuring thus ensuring a more realistic output than other output forms 
with respect to time.
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CHAPTER Y 
RESEARCH FINDINGS
5.1. Introduction
This chapter documents the verification outputs and analysis results. The initial 
stage of the methodology, as it was explained in previous chapter, is to identify system 
and/or its subsystems partial failure parameters. This is an important factor to insert the 
observation point to detect and monitor partial failure. To do so, there are two 
requirements, which are running in parallel. As shown in Figure 10, the first requirement 
is the three major steps that reach down to a level of observation point insertion. These 
major steps are: 1) focus on the potential area inputs, outputs and the number of 
components involved during occurrence of partial failures; 2) minimize the potential area 
size down to a level of simple logic gates (Menor, 1991); 3) utilize critical path 
techniques to achieve exact position of observation point to solve the problem of the 
partial failure that affects the potential area and force it not to propagate to the higher 
level or to system primary output (Youssef, 1996).
The second requirement is using the questionnaire. The questionnaire was 
designed to run with the major steps in parallel to identify partial failures parameters and 
predict their averages and tolerances ranges. The questionnaire was also developed in an 
effort to document expert opinion on the parameters sought. The questionnaire utilized is 
provided in Appendix A, Appendix D and Appendix F to simulate the estimated system 
parameters output of each expert input histogram with different expert confidence. All 
sets of opinions derived from experts were implemented. Each parameter was arranged
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into three levels of measures, maximum (the parameter has positive value from normal), 
normal (the exact parameter value measure), and minimum (the parameter has negative 
value from normal). Each level of measures was also arranged in percentage as 75%, 
50% and 25% as the expert’s estimated input confidence of the parameters value. For 
each expert experience three levels of weight factors were selected as 75%, 50% and 
25%. The senior expert among participants should have 50% or 25% weight factor more 
than other experts. The small percentage range was selected narrowly (75%, 50% and 
25%) because the system under study is small and it requires a specific expert skill and 
knowledge.
In this research, the fire control system tracking radar detector unit was evaluated 
using NTT, which is currently installed onboard Bahrain Royal Naval Force ships. Table 
B1-Appendix B displays failure rates and repair rates for tracking radar detector unit as a 
subsystem. Three experts provided these data; two are from Contracted Maintenance 
Support Company (CMSC), and one from the Royal Naval electronic and electrical 
workshop. Table B1 shows also that the calculation of failure location time is based 
entirely on the BITE, with the estimation of two states of operation of go or no-go. This 
time can be longer if a certain Navy has only unskilled people that are unable to correctly 
interpret BITE information; the repair time calculation is based entirely on spare parts, 
people availability, and location.
Tracking radar system (MTBF) Total Mean Time Between Failure, (MTTF) 
Mean Time to Failure, and (MTTR) Mean Time to Repair were calculated (See Table B4 
Appendix B) as follows:
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The total MTBF is = 106/ S  subsystems Failure Rate = 106 / 838.32 = 1192.86 hrs.
The predicted MTTR is = X (Failure Rate* (Location Time+ Repair Time)) / 
(Total Failure Rate)
= 51256.31/ 838.32 -  61.15 rnins 
The predicted MTTF is then MTBF -  MTTR = 1192.86 -  (61.15/60) = 1191.84 hrs.
These experts categorized the BITE failures detection in the fire control system tracking 
radar into three levels as shown in Table B2 in Appendix B.
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5.2. The New Test Technique (NTT)
5.2.1. Major Steps Analysis
Detecting and monitoring partial failures of dynamic systems NTT was applied 
on the detector unit (as subsystem unit) of the tracking radar system. As explained earlier 
in chapter HI, the design team, using a variety of detection approaches, has identified the 
partial failure. This type of partial failure that is induced in the detector unit can be 
explained briefly as follows: detector unit consists of two detection channels, elevation 
and azimuth. Each elevation and azimuth channel is divided into a course correction 
detection channel and fine correction channel. The outputs of these two channels are then 
fed to the elevation synchro and azimuth synchro. The outputs of both synchros are then 
fed to the elevation and azimuth hydraulic motors, which then move the radar director 
antenna to the exact target position. Figure 11 shows a simplified detector unit and its 
follow-up system block diagram.
Figure 11. Simplified Detector Subsystem and Follow-up System Block Diagram
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Figure 12 shows the potential area minimization by reducing its size in each 
display of elevation and azimuth circuits (Unit IE-1) as single logic gate diagrams. This 
is because the partial failure occurs at a specific system operation cycle. This means that 
not all inputs and outputs of the circuits are required to be considered at that particular 
operation (Menon and Abramonvici, 1991).
5.2.1.1. Critical Path Execution
Figure 12 demonstrates tracking radar detector unit partial failure and how it is 
possible to detect this partial failure by insertion of observation points. In this partial 
failure case, gate A output must be closed to logic zero value after tracking the target. But 
this partial failure occurs because at gate A output a value equal to 1 is induced, which 
means that, an output failure at gate A has occurred.
To detect this partial failure, path tracing was used to identify the best observation 
point that can help the partial failure to propagate and then to be identified and 
monitored. Forward path tracing (Bold Line) from the partial failure potential area site is 
used to identify the propagation path for the specific partial failure. It was noticed that 
this partial failure is propagated through gates E and G, but is blocked at gate H and J and 
therefore doesn’t propagate to a higher level (i.e., from components level to subsystem 
level) or to a primary output. Inserting an observation point x between the inputs of gates 
G and H or an observation point at output gate G would enable the partial failure to be 
identified. Therefore these two suggested observation points form one set of solutions for 
this specific partial failure detection problem in the tracking radar detector unit.
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Based on the above discussion, this partial failure shows that not all components 
of the tracking radar detector unit performed correctly. In other words, not all 
components that are equal to k number of eomponents-out-of-n number of components 
on this specific operation cycle performed correctly.
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Figure 12. Elevation and Azimuth Circuits (Unit IE-1)
5.2.I.2. Markov Chain Technique
Tables B2 and B3 indicate that BITE capability in detecting partial failures is not 
enough. Probability of .2 to .8 of undetected partial failures by BITE can cause 
degradation of system performance and a high cost of repair, especially when these 
partial failures occurred and spread over the entire system. Tables B2 and B3 in 
Appendix B show the BITE detection failures capability in relation to repair activity.
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Based on these tables’ strategy, the probability for each possible state can be calculated 
using the transition matrixes shown in Figures 13 and 14a and b.
V ,f, ?
i n  m.*.
maw* ,*S:
r . _ _____ ? 2 3
.............
i f ' " '  i 3
_ __ ______ 1 "a 0 0? ‘ owf ? o f "  0.05 ' '6 920 J 0 2 0 ' ' ) “o. ........3 0 0 i '  ’ 3 n <■> . . . . . .
Of* f Pf f ifNf KiMh*! i mimei’lMll-tf I'hliiKC
Figure 13. First and Second Partial Failure Detection Probability Using Markov Process
Based on the BITE maintenance strategy, with the use of NTT as a support 
system, Markov chains can be utilized. Figures 14a and b show the transition matrix and 
the BITE detection technique with NTT process using Markov chains. Matrix elements 1, 
2, 3 and 6 are the transit states, and 4, 5, 8, 7, 9,10,11 are the trappings states.
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Transition Matrix
1 2j 3! 6 s 4 7I 8 9 10 11:
1 0 0.92 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.08 0 0
2 0 0 0.83 0.09 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
3 0 0 0 0 0.92 0.92 0 0 0 0 0
4 0 0 0 0 0 1 0.94 0 0 0 0
5 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
@ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.07 0 0 0
7 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0.01
10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
Figure 14a. Transition Matrix
Figure 14b. BITE Detection Technique with NTT Process Using Markov Chains
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The matrix of number of visits can be calculated as follows:
E = (I -  Q)- 1.
r  i 0.92 0.762 0 b 00 1
0 1 0.E28 0.092
0 0 1 0
r o 0 0 1 J
The matrix of probability of visit from the transit state to the trapping state is:
A = E. R =
'0.697 0.065 0.0055 0.0775 0.08 0.0004 0.0796 0.0775 ^
0.758 0.0704 0.006 0.00842 0 0 0 0.00842
0.95 0.085 0 0 0 0 0 0
£ 0 0.065 0.95 0 0 0 0.95 ^
Calculating the cost of repair for the complete detector unit or its simple module 
unit (1 E-l) using the matrix of probability is as follows: the probability from state 1 to 
state 10 is .0004 and the cost of repair using Figure 14b is:
= Complete detector unit failure per year X .0004 X labor cost X average actual 
repair time.
In case of unit (1 E-l) then
= Partial failure module unit (1 E-l) per year x .0004 x labor cost x average 
actual repair time.
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5.2X3. System Performance and Availability
Tables Bl, B2, Cl, C2, and C3 in Appendixes B and C show that the availability 
of the system and system performance can be improved by maintaining (1 E-l) channel 
unit instead of repairing the whole unit of the detector unit, of which (1 E-l) channel unit 
is one part.
From Appendix A, part 1, the failure rate for (1 E-l) channel unit is equal to 
5.371 F/m (failure per million). This failure rate excludes the connectors’ failure rates, 
the feedback correction circuits group, the synchro unit, and environmental effect. So to 
adjust this failure rate, this research utilized an approximate approach provided by Green 
and Bourne (1972), which uses various K factors multiplied by the failure rate data. 
These various K factors were used to relate the data to other conditions of the 
environment and stress, where K is the environment factor adjustment coefficient used to 
represent the components’ stress levels altered by environmental conditions. Typical K 
factors are given in Appendix C where Ki relates to the general environment of operation, 
K2 to the specific rating or stress of the component, and K3 to the general effect of 
temperature. The equipment on the fire control system tracking radar is considered to be 
exposed to an outdoor marine environment. For this partial failure, a Ki factor of 2 is 
used and K2 and K3 are 1.
The adjusted failure rate V  is
X' = XY^
X' = 5.371 x Ki xK 2 xK 3 = 10.74 failure per million operating hours
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and
MTBF = IIV
= 1/10.74 = .03717xl06 
1 E-l Channel unit MTBF shows that the addition of observation points at point x or y 
can extend the availability with high performance of the system by the amount equal to 
Availability = MTBF/ (MTBF + MTTR)
= .3717/ (.3727 + MTTR)
Where, availability is the Inherent Availability, which is based solely on the failure 
distribution and repair time distribution. See figure 15.
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Figure 15. The System Availability with Respect to Main Time to Repair
5.2.2. Questionnaire Analysis
Analyzing the data, which experts provided for the detector unit, shows that their 
estimates were different. This usually occurs due to experts making different assumptions 
from the same partial failure data. The experts provide their knowledge and opinion about 
the potential problem area via their observation of the system’s behavior during
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occurrence of partial failure. To solve this problem of opinion difference, Vose (1996) 
clarified the idea of the experts’ opinion differences by combining two dissimilar expert 
opinions if confidence in both opinions is similar after conferring with someone more 
senior in the same field. In this research, the experts’ opinions were required to provide a 
strategic maintenance decision between getting the benefits of inserting best observation 
points to support the current BITE to identify and monitor partial failures, or to stick with 
current BITE as go or no-go method. However, in this particular partial failure 
evaluation, case maintenance decision-making is required. This is designed to help decide 
between replacing the complete detector unit (the whole subsystem) or repairing it, or 
replacing a module (component) or repairing it. Table B3 show tracking radar detector 
maintenance and logistics costs.
Two categorization questionnaires were delivered to the experts to get their 
opinion on the tracking radar in general and the detector unit in particular during and 
after occurrence of partial failure using NTT. These questionnaires were also designed to 
identify potential parameters, and to see the partial failure effect on the system and/or its 
subsystems during and after occurrence. To do this, each participating expert was 
weighted in percentage depending on his or her level of experience. Also each estimated 
answer was weighted as a percentage depending on each expert’s measured confidence 
level.
The first category results of the questionnaire are presented by three-dimensional 
figures that display the expert’s opinion on the input and the output of the parameters’
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condition for the detector unit during and after occurrence of partial failure. Appendix D 
figures D1 a, b, c, and d display these opinions. Along the z-axis, each expert’s opinion is 
presented as a vertical single slot. Along x-axis, three ranges minimum, normal and 
maximum in percentage, is used to display the estimated expert input confidence level to 
defined parameters that were involved to generate this particular partial failure. Finally, 
the y-axis is used to display the number of input or output parameters. The color code is 
used to show the weight factor in percentage as the confidence level for each expert 
opinion. In this research the input and output parameters for the detector unit were 
specified and weighted as follows:
• Minimum -  below the average line (on negative side) but within the average 
reading.
• Normal = on the average line.
• Maximum = above the average line (on positive side) but within the average 
reading.
The second category of questionnaire was designed to identify the most 
influential parameters among those identified. Figure Die displays the most influential 
parameters. In the detector unit, the experts concluded that voltage and current were the 
most influential parameters inducing this type of partial failure. This is because voltage 
and current can affect other parameters like internal components vibration and increase in 
temperature. So the other two parameters -  vibration and temperature -  were dependent 
on the current and the voltage in this case. It can be concluded that without identifying
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and repairing this type of partial failure, the effect can spread to the whole system’s 
components or its subsystems to cause complete failure.
The questionnaires were utilized to identify the parameters, and among those 
parameters the most effective parameters were identified. To insert observation test 
points, the experts’ opinion was required also at this level. This is because expert opinion 
can support the estimation of the observation point average and tolerance limitation. As 
stated earlier, each expert has three rating confidence factors to select: minimum, normal 
and maximum. Each level of confidence consists of three estimated partial failure 
occurrence accuracy of 75%, 50%, and 25% with respect to normal value. Choosing none 
or 0% means the parameter is never changed and stayed constant. However, each expert 
also was weighted depending on his or her experience (Vose, 1996). The weighted factor 
was divided into three levels of confidence, 75%, 50%, 25%, and none or 0%. Choosing 
none or 0% means that the expertise between the experts is the same (Chytka, et al 2003).
5.2.2.I. Average Limitation Values of Observation Point
Calculating average and tolerance limits of selected observation points using the 
experts’ opinion is as follows:
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Figure 16. Calculating Average Limitation for Selected Observation Point
Figure Die in Appendix D shows the probability that the partial failure occurs at the 
maximum voltage limitation area, as estimated by two out of three experts is 75% and 
25%, respectively. The senior expert’s input opinion for occurrence of this type of failure 
was 50% higher than the other expert. The experience weight factor for the senior expert 
was 75% and for the other expert it was 25%. Occurrence of partial failure due to 
maximum voltage can be calculated as:
{Estimated values for expert 1 input x estimated experience weight factor for 
expert 1} + {estimated values for expert 2 input x estimated experience weight 
factor for expert 2}= (.75 x .75) + (.25 x .25) = 0.625 = 62.5%
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The estimated tolerance range level selected by only two experts was above 
0.33% and below .66% of + 5 volts. See Appendix D.
and
(.75 x .5) = .375 = 37.5 % is the accuracy of partial failure as estimated by the 
third expert, and with estimated tolerance range level above .67% of -5 volts.
Now,
the external functional test point in Figure 16 as designed should read 24 volts +/- 
5 volts for the director unit to function properly. But this partial failure occurred 
within the tolerance and between the average values of +/- 5 volts.
So,
one can conclude that to identify this partial failure, the observation point (at 
position x  in Figure 16) tolerance limitation should read not more than .33% of 
the average values o f+/- 5 volts, which is equal to +/-1.67 volts.
5.2.2.2. Validation of Results
Face validation form was used to validate the NTT methodology, which is
provided by tolerated modes of communication such as surveys using telephone, E-mail, 
and indirect interviews, in which the expert is interviewed alone, with exchange of the 
data by the researcher to other experts.
The reasons to use face validity rather than other types are:
1. To ensure that the questionnaire, is measuring what it is supposed to be 
measuring.
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2. Within the context of this study, in which the researcher does not act as an passive 
observer, but rather a active participant in the execution of the NTT, assurance is 
provided that the researcher is an expert in the tactical decision- making problem 
domain (Adelman, 1992).
3. Assurance is provided that the experts know which type of information the 
researcher is looking for; that they actually can use the context to help interpret 
the questions and provide more useful, accurate answers (Hunter and Hunter, 
1998), and
4. This is provides a more realistic output of future judgment, even though, most of 
the researchers count this reason as one of face validity’s disadvantages. If the 
researcher, however, is looking to expert opinion to validate a new methodology 
for system integration technology, face validation is a suitable form to apply.
To validate the results, the questionnaires were delivered to the experts to get 
their opinion on the tracking radar as a system in general and the detector unit as a 
subsystem in particular, and to evaluate the methodology. The experts’ confidence level 
of the output results as approval or disapproval in percentage is applied using experts’ 
feedback to measure the accuracy of the NTT methodology. The questionnaire feedback 
used to validate the results of detector unit partial failure is presented in Appendices A, 
B,andD.
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The results validated by the experts relate to the voltage of the detector subsystem of the 
TR system outputs and insertion points, which are used to determine whether a partial 
failure exists. See figure Die and Appendix A, part 6 voltage table.
Table 4 represents the validation result for the experts’ opinion with respect to the results 
of the estimated most important parameter that can cause partial failure in detector unit as 
derived by the NTT. The expert feedback was in essence the same a predicted by the
methodology.
Expert code NTT Expert feedback Remarks
El Voltage .75 .75
-Current .75 .75
BRN Voltage .75 .75
.Current .75 .75
E2 Voltage .75 .75
-Current .75 .75
Table 4 . Comparison of Parameters That Cause Partial Failure in Detector Unit Using 
NTT and Expert Feedback
Table 5 presents the experts’ validation feedback showing that the series-parallel and 
parallel-series configurations can cause partial failure more than other configurations.
Subsystem Coalignratioa Most to Least
Detector Unit
Series 1 .75 1 .75 1 .75
Parallel 1 .5 2 .75 2 .5
Series- Parallel 1 .75 2 .75 1 .75
Parallel-Series 2 .75 3 .75 3 .75
Series- Parallel- Series : .5 0a 0 0 0
Expert Code .7.RN 32
“Judged to be the sam e as a series-parallel configuration.
Table 5. Presents Sensitivity Results for Unit Configuration
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Table 6 presents the NTT results and the experts’ validation feedback on identifying 
partial failures that occur at the detector unit (see also figure 16), which would be 
detected by inserting an observation point x between the inputs gates G and H or an 
observation point at output gate G as b
Expert cede
O bservation
test 
point using 
NTT
O bservation
test 
point from  
expert
feedback
O bservation
test 
point using  
N TT
O bservation
test 
point from 
expert
feedback
Rem arks
A t position
X
A t position
X
At position  
b
A t position  
b
El .75 Same .75 .25
Observation b 
is more close 
to BITE 
measuring 
system close 
loop which 
can effect 
reading
BRN .75 Same .75 Same N o comment
£2 .75 Same .75 .50
Not
recommended 
to insert 
observation 
point b here 
due to many 
outputs 
connected at 
single test 
output which  
can effect the 
reading
Table 6. Validation of Proper Observation Point Insertion
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
73
Table 7 shows the validation results of identifying partial failures that occur at the 
detector unit. The reading of an observation point tolerance limitation should read not 
more than .33% of the average values of +/- 5 volts, which is equal to +/-1.67 volts.
Expert
code
Current system voltage 
measure with tolerance
NTT
C alculation
Expert feedback Rem arks
El
24 volts with +/-5 volts 24% volts with 
+ /-1 .6 7  volt
+/- 1.67 is agreed 
.50 “
Required to be 
measured by 
oscilloscope or digital 
multimeter
BRN + /-1 .6 7  is agreed 
.50
Monitor and measure 
with digital multimeter
5 2 +/- 1.67 is agreed 
.25
Very sensitive to be 
measured with un 
calibrated equipment
Table 7. Observation Point Tolerance Limitation Suggestions
Table 8 presents the validation results of the BITE detection technique with NTT process
using Markov chains.
Expert code
BITE w ith  N TT  
partial failure 
defection capability
BITE w ith  N T T  
partial failure
capability detection  
Expert feedback
Remarks
E l .75 agree Same
Required good and 
w ell organized system  
selection for partial 
failures.
May produce a very 
sensitive failure 
detection system, 
which is not 
recommended in 
operational systems.
BRN .75 agree Same Required good system  
to select, where partial 
failure can be 
monitored and detected
5 2 .75 agree Same It may add more cost 
for short term, but for 
can be justified for 
long term
Table 8 .Validation ! 
Markov Ch
Results of BITE Detection Technique with NTT Process Using 
ains
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The following table summarizes the validity of NTT results experts’ feedback applied on 
fire control system tracking radar detector unit and with respect to BITE system.
S/N Questionnaire NTT Expert Output 
Feedback
Remarks
m it t
Voltage as most important 
parameter that can cause 
partial failure in the detector 
unit
.75 .75 Same
2
Most system configurations 
ihai cause partial failures
Series- ?;~u.tie. 
.75
Series- Parallel
.75 Same
3 Parallel- Series 
.75
Parallel- Series
.75 S j
4
Proper selection for 
observation point insertion
Point at 
position
X
.75
Pc: u  jA 
position
X
.75
Same
5
Point at 
position 
b
.75
Point at 
nosr.ic:’.
b
.50
Not the same
6 Voltage tolerance measure .1 1 Not the same
Table 9. Summarizes the Validity of NTT Results Output and Experts’ Feedback 
Applied to Fire Control System Detector Unit
s.e r;
0.2 U
0.75NTT results output
0.75 0.75Experts' feedback
Table 10. Validation of NTT Results Output Using Experts’ Feedback
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From Table 9 and Table 10, NTT methodology validation results approve that it is 
capable to provide a good support technique to the BITE system. This then can lead to 
maximum recovery in the number of failure recorded against system and availability and 
performance, which will maintain the system in full operation and maximum 
performance.
Additionally, in Table 9 and Table 10, the validation of NTT results output and 
experts’ feedback approved that the best insertion observation point to detect the partial 
failure that occurred in the tracking radar detector unit is point x. This is approved that 
using observation test point can increase the detection of partial failure, when used 
properly, can support BITE.
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CHAPTER VI 
DISCUSSION
6.1. Discussion
It was noticed in the prior literature that many researchers have developed 
technologies using probabilistic techniques to assist in the decision-making during built 
in test equipment (BITE) design. This implementation of such technologies may have 
been done for the best of reasons, but that cannot achieve certain levels of improvement 
in detecting partial failures. This research introduced a new methodology called New 
Testing Technique (NTT) to detect partial failures, which can detect and monitor the 
progress of the partial failures depending on strategic maintenance decision-making or 
mission requirements. This methodology consists of eight phases: 1) problem definition, 
2) criteria selection, 3) definition of the parameters that cause partial failure, 4) 
construction and administration of questionnaire, 5) results, 6) revision and correction, 7) 
observation point insertion, and 8) validation of methodology. These phases were well 
defined in chapter 4.
Additionally, two methodology requirements were discussed in detail in chapter
5. These two requirements should run parallel to the implementation of NTT 
methodology. These requirements are a combination of a well-designed questionnaire 
(depends on the system under study) that runs parallel with major steps to identify partial 
failure parameters that cause the failure and then to predict partial failure their averages 
and tolerance ranges (see figure 10 for requirements process). Additionally, a
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questionnaire was developed in an effort to document expert opinion about the 
parameters sought.
NTT was applied on the fire control system detector unit to detect a specific 
partial failure, which is normally induced after the tracking radar tracks a target. 
Demonstration was done on one single subsystem of the total system, which in this case 
limits the methodology’s overall capacity. Applying the methodology on the entire fire 
control system can provide more realistic information to check its capability.
It was noticed that the result using face validity could provide more realistic 
strategic decision-making regarding maintenance. This is because both research 
hypotheses points were achieved. The first hypothesis stated that partial failures on naval 
ships electronic systems could be detected by inserting test point in electronic naval 
systems. The second hypothesis is a completion of the first, which is to determine the 
appropriate place for test point insertion by using experts’ judgment. Using the results of 
the expert questionnaire, one can insert observation points to support BITE to identify 
and monitor partial failure. Even though the number of experts was small, the detector as 
a subsystem under study was quite enough.
The questionnaire attempted to capture the experts’ opinions about occurrence, 
detection and monitoring partial failure. Then the validation results from the experts are 
used as decision-making support for strategic maintenance decisions, although, more 
generally, these types of questionnaires can be used to obtain opinions about any system.
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The modes of communication that were used, such as telephone, E-mail, and 
indirect interview discussions, are important because they give researchers an opportunity 
to indicate what the experts liked and disliked about the system, and how they would 
improve it. It has been noticed that short answers are important, because they attempt to 
quantify the experts’ opinions.
As stated earlier, face validation form was used to validate the NTT methodology, 
with provided tolerated modes of communication such as surveys using telephone, E- 
mail, and indirect interviews in which the expert is interviewed alone, with exchanges of 
data by the researcher to other experts. However, face validation has a possible limitation 
such as realistic future output assessments. An example is this research, in which one 
tries to validate a new methodology technique for implementing a new integrating 
technology to detect and monitor partial failures. There is an additional limitation on the 
experts’ side. If the experts know what information the researcher is looking for, they 
might try to “bend and shape” their answers to what they think the researcher wants. In 
other words, fake good or fake bad.
This research assumed that problems arising on the fire control system are purely 
hardware problems. This is to identify fire control system boundaries and also its 
subsystems that are going to be involved at that moment to complete system operation 
cycle. This assumption can raise a question(s) regarding adding the social part of system, 
such as wrong action by operator, bad training, and different system environmental 
conditions. These questions are good challenge for future research.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
79
One observation point concerning the results is worth indicating. The selection of 
experts, depending on their system knowledge and specialty background, can be 
extremely helpful in calculating average and tolerance limits of selected observation 
points.
An interesting point that was not discussed and can create a good challenge for 
future research is applying NTT methodology on micromanagement systems. This is 
especially true when one considers the detection and monitoring of partial failure in any 
mechanical parts as any employee’s behavior that detected and monitored by voice 
communication surveillance, video monitoring surveillance, and most recently computer 
and data communication surveillance. This detection and monitoring behavior can reflect 
negative effects and can be extremely detrimental to companies and their existing 
corporate culture.
In reality, detecting all possible partial failures is not possible in social systems 
because the boundary is not well identified and so the partial failure that occurs without 
notice can impact on overall organization performance. For example, one can consider 
that the people who work for a micromanager feel that their boss does not trust them; 
why else would the boss always be looking over their shoulder. This feeling can induce a 
chain of partial failures such as a little loyalty to the manager or the organization. 
Therefore, motivation is low, which is a great partial failure, or quality suffers, which can 
affect the performance and reduce the product’s acceptable level.
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Finally, one (generally!) can conclude that the go-no-go technique on designing 
BITE may not provide sufficiently high failure or partial failure coverage. The 
requirement is to provide a support technique to the BITE system that reduces the time 
gap between the accruing of partial failures and BITE system reaction. This then can lead 
to maximum recovery in the number of failures recorded against system availability and 
performance, which will maintain the system in full operation and maximum 
performance.
6.2. Validation
Validity in this research means the degree to which a study accurately reflects or 
assesses the specific concept that the researcher is attempting to measure. Face validity 
form was used with principle mechanisms such as surveys using the modes of telephone, 
E-mail, and indirect interviews to validate research methodology.
Face validation was used to validate the output result. This is done by how the 
measurement procedure appears. Does it seem like a reasonable way to gain the 
information the researcher is attempting to obtain? Does the research process, in using 
new test techniques, seem well designed? Table 9 summarizes the validity of NTT results 
and the experts’ feedback that was applied on fire control system tracking radar detector 
unit.
Two major companies dealing with Bahrain Royal Naval ships overhaul validated 
the result of the research finding after experts’ feedback on how well we are doing. The 
first company is VSE Corporation, which is also the supporter research company. The
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company’s management department stated that, “this research is a very interesting field 
of knowledge and integrating way of technology, which can support any system with 
BITE. The observation point suggested by the research author can give advanced 
detection and monitoring, especially with new integrated systems that’s going on the 
Bahrain Royal Navy with the old systems.” The other company is LURSSENS Logistics. 
This company evaluated and validated this research technically. LURSSENS’ technical 
and quality department showed that the observation point process and testing techniques 
could be recommended in harbor and sea acceptance tests.
Finally, both companies recommended that evaluation results required collecting 
field data after implementation. This process requires years of effort. Appendix E shows 
the validation letters for both companies.
6.3. Summary
An objective of this research effort was to develop a methodology for detecting 
partial failures in dynamic systems such as fire control system tracking radar. This effort 
was achieved by satisfying two research hypotheses points. The first is by inserting 
observation test points using a critical path tracing technique. The second is by using the 
experts’ judgment to determine the appropriate place for observation test point insertion. 
However, the methodology developed herein was based on the combined research of 
authors such as Yellman (1999), Comer and Angstadt (2001), Conway (2003), Vose
(1996) and Youssef (1993). Other authors, such as Hadler and S.Mahadevan (2000), 
Comer and Angstadt (2001), and Ebeling (1996), provided an alternative meaning for
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partial failure, such as critical failure and non-critical failure, or such as fail danger or 
fail-safe.
The research also demonstrates that the use of expert opinion can focus more on 
the potential area inputs, outputs and the number of components involved during 
occurrence of potential failures. It also can utilize critical path techniques. Finally, the 
research shows that inserting observation test points can help develop improved decision 
-making on maintenance. That will support and manage maintenance with BITE(s) to 
monitor and predict dynamic system partial failures before they significantly damage the 
system or its subsystem.
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CHAPTER VII 
CONCLUSIONS
7.1. Conclusions
This study contributes to the Engineering Management body of knowledge by 
identifying a new kind of decision-making with an associated solution approach. 
However, this research provides a tool that permits a new practical way for identifying 
partial failures. In addition to the new way of testing, the combination of the wide 
spectrum of techniques and approaches, which have been developed by different and 
conceptually distinct disciplines, can enhance future studies in this field. This integrative 
approach was consistent with the philosophy of Engineering Management, which can be 
verbalized as creating maximum managerial utility from knowledge and technologies 
generated by different disciplines.
The go-no-go technique on designing BITE may not provide sufficiently high 
failure or partial failure coverage. The requirement is to provide a support technique to 
the BITE system that reduces the time gap between the accruing of partial failures and 
BITE system reaction. This then can lead to maximum recovery in the number of failures 
recorded against system availability and performance, which will maintain the system in 
full operation and maximum performance.
Estimation of two states that consist of either operational state or non-operational 
state in reality is going to cover system function failure only and not failure that occurred 
due to system performance. In such cases, a different approach is required to have
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maximum failure recovery for system performance and availability in addition to system 
function. This was achieved by inserting observation points in proper selected areas in the 
system. In doing so, maximum monitoring, and controlling failure coverage is obtained. 
However, this research, like all other research, is not risk free. Maintenance decision­
making regarding the number of partial failures that required to be identified was 
important. As one increases the number of partial failures detected, the operation of the 
overall system becomes more sensitive, and thus the system’s performance progress can 
be interrupted.
An important point that one should conclude about partial failures is that the 
underlying knowledge is scarce and not sufficient in most cases. The studies that 
investigate the partial failures and their impact on system performance are few, if any. 
They often address specific and isolated case areas. There is no previous research 
studying partial failures that impact the dynamic systems in a wide scale area.
Finally, the methodology that is proposed in this research was not considered 
before. This methodology uses a combination of Markov technique, multi-sate k-out-of- 
n: G: systems analysis, and critical path tracing techniques to solve the problem 
effectively by supporting decision makers associated with fire control system tracking 
radar, which is installed onboard Bahrain Naval ships.
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7.2. Limitation
A limitation of the research is associated with the size of the system under study. 
The methodology was demonstrated on one single subsystem of the total system, which 
in this case limits the methodology’s overall application capability. Testing the 
methodology on the entire fire control system will provide more realistic information to 
check its capability. Moreover, a restriction on most electronic equipment related to 
Naval systems adds anther company limitation. Adding wide rages of different types of 
electrical and mechanical systems can provide methodology evaluations. This is because 
output from the validation process can result in innovative ways to improve the testing 
process.
The selection of experts, based on their system knowledge and specialty 
background, can be extremely helpful in calculating average and tolerance limits of 
selected observation points. However, this increases the time required for selection, 
which sometime limits the numbers of experts participating. This is especially the case 
when the researcher used the telephone, E-mail and indirect interview mode of 
communication.
Another limitation in this study is the number of experts involved in the study. 
Additional expert opinion can provide a more effective focus on the potential area inputs 
and outputs so that critical path techniques can be more easily utilized. Also, this presents 
more feedback from experts to validate the methodology, which gives more reliable 
results than relying on only a limited number of experts. Additionally, in the field of
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expert opinion, data was fed manually. This process consumes time in calculating the 
results of the data, which then must to be validated. A new computerized strategy would 
make the process more efficient, accurate, and time saving.
Limitations in the support system can play a major factor on selection of which 
partial failures are to be controlled and monitored. Although this methodology has been 
demonstrated on a single partial failure that involves only a single subsystem unit, it is 
not anticipated that greater numbers of subsystems will increase the complexity of the 
implementation strategy.
The mode of communication used in this research, such as telephone and E - 
mails, limits detailed or extensive information. The telephone is not suited to asking the 
experts complex questions or to probing for the assumptions that the expert made in 
arriving at an answer. Similarly, the telephone mode should not be used to conduct the 
verbal report elicitation technique. E-mail is good for eliciting simple data. But its 
limitation was shown when the researcher had to send complex instructions or detailed 
problem solving data from one expert to another.
Face validation has a possible limitation if the experts know what information the 
researcher is looking for, because they might try to “bend and shape” their answers to 
what they think researcher wants. In other words, fake good or fake bad. Also, one major 
limitation in using face validation is the weakness in looking for more realistic output on 
the system’s future performance. For example, this is especially relevant in this research
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when trying to validate a new methodology technique for implementing a new integrating 
technology to detect and monitor partial failures.
This methodology is not limited to any specific method for analyzing the data, but 
can be used with other design analysis tools with no change in implementation strategy.
7.3. Future Research
The ultimate extension of the research is that the methodology will be applied 
more efficiently when collected field data have validated the system results after 
integrating the system with the new technology to detect and monitor partial failures. 
This research might also be extended, using critical path tracing, to cover larger units in 
system design. Additionally, the research could be applied to the problem of partial 
failure involving more than two systems integrated together and more than three experts 
to provide opinions. The optimal solution would then be to use a single observation test 
point to detect more than one partial failure.
One interesting point for future research is when testing this methodology on a 
social system. As is known, the boundary and input and output of mechanical and 
electrical systems can be defined by their territory or by the physical space occupied or 
used by specific components during every different cycle of the system operation. But on 
the other hand, the boundary of the social system can also be defined by the people 
directly involved in the creation, production, or transformation of the input into output. 
One important major step in research methodology is to focus on the potential area by
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reducing it down to a level of logic gates such as AND, NAND, OR, NOR, and NOT 
with single input and output. This major point could be a challenging future research 
when applied on social systems where unexpected conflicts due to partial failure (i.e. 
system changes state, its purpose, product, boundaries, or environments) can occur for 
many reasons. Conflicts and ambiguities in the social system can also become an 
excellent opportunity to study the impact of partial failure.
An interesting point and good challenge for future research is applying NTT 
methodology on micromanagement to identify the partial failures that occur without 
noticing the impact on overall organization performance. For example, one can consider 
that the people who work for a micromanager feel that their boss doesn’t trust them; why 
else would the boss always be looking over their shoulder. This feeling can induce a 
chain of partial failures such as a little loyalty to the manager or the organization. 
Therefore, motivation is low, which is a great partial failure, or quality suffers, which can 
affect the performance and reduce the product output standard.
Finally, studying the integration of two systems with different behavior, such as a 
mechanical or electrical system sharing the boundaries with a social system, can be an 
interesting point to research. This is because the movement of the mechanical or the 
electrical systems is designed (depending on commands it received) to move from one 
state of operation to other state of operation with a fixed number of components. This 
assumes that the components have fixed boundaries, whereas in reality the involvement 
of a social system with a mechanical or electrical system can create a flexible boundary.
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APPENDIX A 
Input Parameter Questionnaire 
(Expert Opinion on Technical System Field)
Part 1.
a. The name of the subsystem for analysis is detector unit.
b. The number of partial failures recorded from Aug 1998 to July 2002 was eight partial 
failures in the workshops and ships logs manuals. The failure part in the detector unit is 
module channel and its failure rate was equal to 5.371 F/m hrs.
c. The experts were weighted depends on their experience as follow:
• El = 75%
• BRN = 25%
• E2 = 25%
Part 2.
Subsystems defective recorded due to the partial failure from Aug 1998 to July 2002 is:
Subsystem Partial failure 
Occorrenees*
M T BF M TTF MTTR Location
Tim e
Switch 15 2.50E+07 3.89E-02 0.00112129019 0
Fan 0 3.00E+05 3.16E+00 0.172792013 0
Fan 2 3.00E+05 3.16E+00 0.172792013 0
Heating Element 3 3.33E+05 2.84E+00 0.15566848 0
Antenna 0 1.00E+05 8.56E+00 1.443362916 0
Monopulse Unit 4 L49E+04 5.97E+01 7.2750501 N/A
Microwave Unit 5.00E+03 1.82E+02 18.1315011 N /A
Power Supply 0 7.38E+04 1.31E+01 0.420245252 N/A
TWT and Power Unit 2/9** 1.32E+04 7.05E+01 5.530107835 N /A
IF Preamplifier 5 5.53E+04 1.68E+01 1.316311194 N /A
COHO Unite 0 5.14E+04 1.88E+01 0.60323027 N A
Detector 8 8.09B+04 1.18E+01 0.530775837 N /A
IF Gain Control 5 1.03E+05 9.40E+00 0.300839775 N /A
A/D Converter 7 2.75E+04 3.52E+01 1.126753507 N /A
Serial Link 4 4.97E+04 1.91E+01 0.983526577 N /A
Monitoring Unit 3 7.33E+04 1.32E+01 0.423346693 N /A
Gyro Unit G 8.83E+03 1.07E+02 6.214762859 N /A
Stalo ' 5.52E+03 1.67E+02 14.24992843 N /A
Pulse Exp/Comp \ & 2.62E+04 3.60E+01 2.090609791 N /A
* Per three years (1998-2002) duration- Bahrain Royal Naval Force Workshops log book. 
** Two failures in number occur in TWT/ nine due to the power supply.
N/A Not available.
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Part 3.
Estimate with confidence level a list of the subsystems that have most partial failure 
record without causing system to shutdown immediately. The ranges of values should 
include most partial failure causing = 3, Least partial failure causing = 1, and midpoint 
partial failure cause -  2.
S ubsystem Most to Least
Usages
Yataes
Confidence
Level
Ranges
Values
Confidence
Level
Ranges
Values LevM
TWT and Power Unit 3 .75 3 .75 3 .75
Monopulse Unit 2 .5 3 .5 3 .75
Detector 3 .75 3 .75 3 .75
Power Supply 3 .25 3 .25 D .5
Microwave Unit 3 .5 2 .5 3 .5
Serial Link 2 .5 2 .75 D .5
COHO Unite 2 .25 2 .25 2 .25
Heating Element 1 .5 2 .75 2 .75
IF Gain Control 2 .75 1 .75 1 .75
A/D Converter 2 .5 1 .25 3 .5
IF Preamplifier 1 .75 1 .75 1 .75
Monitoring Unit 2 .25 1 .25 1 .25
Gyro Unit 2 .75 1 .75 2 .75
Antenna 2 .5 1 .75 2 .5
Pulse Exp/Comp 2 .5 1 .5 2 .5
lixce-l Code El RH " B2 ' T .
Part 4.
List with confidence level all detector unit configurations, which can cause partial failure 
more than other configurations in this unit. The ranges of values should include Most = 3, 
Least = 1, and Midpoint = 2, or 0 for none.
Subsystem Configuration Most to Least
Detector Unit
Series 1 .75 i .75 1 .75
Parallel 1 .5 2 .75 2 .5
Series- Parallel 1 .75 2 .75 1 .75
Parallel- Series 2 .75 3 .75 3 .75
Series- Parallel- Series 2 5 0 0 0 0
Expert Code ■i: 52
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Part 5.
During occurrence of partial failures in detector subsystem, provide estimate parameters 
INPUT- OUTPUT ranges that cause partial failures. The ranges of values should include 
Most = 3, Least = 1, and Midpoint = 2, or 0 for none. (Design problem)
y . tosw | Input
i  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
I Output 1
Minimum 1 .75 1 .75 1 .75 ! 1 .75 0 0 t .25
Normal 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Maximum 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 .75 0 0
C'jdii i El !i...brn j ; E2 !; E l ■L .B R N  JL.... 332- J
Current Input O utput
Minimum 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Normal 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Maximum 3 .75 3 .25 3 .5 3 .75 3 .75 3 .75
Cede y “y. j 3 : i K  j 22 ■ ; ~.'2 \
Vibrattan Input O utput
Minimum 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Normal 2 .75 ,0 0 2 .5 0 0 0 0 0 0
Maximum 0 0 3 .5 0 0 3 .75 3 .25 3 .5
Expert Coco :1 B S a E2 31 U'S RN I t ! ' ' -
Tem perature Input O utput
Minimum 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Normal 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Maximum 3 .75 3 .5 3 2 ' 3 .5 3 .75 3 .5
Export Cods 21 s 3 N  ' r'2 n
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Part 6.
After occurrence of partial failures in detector unit, provide estimate ranges to the 
INPUT- OUTPUT parameters condition. The ranges of values should include Most = 3, 
Least = 1, and Midpoint = 2, or 0 for none. (See circuit diagram).
Voltage Input Output
LOW 0 0 2 .5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Moderate 3 .75 0 0 2 .5 0 0 0 0 0 0
Maximum 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 .75 3 .75 3 .75
i’xjcr. Cod; H. I ' L2 j E2
Correirt Input Output
LOW 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Moderate 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Maximum 3 .75 3 .75 ? .75 3 .75 3 .75 3 .75
Expert Code El v2 El BKN E2
Vibration Input Output
LOW 2 .5 0 0 2 .5 2 .5 0 0 2 .5
Moderate 0 0 3 .75 0 0 0 0 3 .75 0 0
Maximum 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
'.Ixoert Code El BN B2 61v 5": l S
Temperature Input Output
LOW 2 .5 0 0 2 .5 2 .5 0 0 0 0
Moderate 0 0 3 .75 0 0 0 0 3 .75 3 .75
Maximum 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
.Lvr.e.-t Code ;v. BRN 7.2 ETC y.i
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Part 7
With respect to the external environment within the system, which of the following 
eqiiipment(s) can cause partial failure if it’s close to the detector subsystem.
EfnipiiientCs) Specify
measure
unit
Normal Minimum Maximum Eecor
d
A. Main power Supply mV 3/ High Max*
B. Installation in Hazardous 
Area
N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
D. Vibration chock Proofed N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
*Maximum reading during partial failure occurrence, which means reading, is within the average but above the average line.
Part 8.
From your experience, which type of observation point is required to control or monitor 
output signals of these specific system partial failures? Most =3, Least =1, Midpoint =1.
Indication 3 3 3
Low Alarm v C r;
Excc-rL Code e : 3R>: £2
Part 9.
Installation Area.
Other -  Specific Outdoor/ Indoor 3
BRN
Part 10.
In supporting your confidence to detect these partial failures, Estimate an observation 
point insertion place.
1. Outside the located cabinet if 
possible.
0 0 0
2. Outside printed circuit board. oJ) 3 3
3. At the front of main unit 0 0
Expert Code El BEX E2
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APPENDIX B
Tracking Radar Subsystems And Detector Unit Repair Cost Data
Subsystem f  aiiore Rate X
m m
Failure Location
Time (Miamles)
Repair Time 
p (Minutes)
Failure Rate * 
(Location + Repair 
Time)
Switch 0.04 23 0.5 .93
Fan 3.33 43 0.5 144.86
Fan 3.33 43 0.5 144.86
Heating Element 3 43 0.5 130.5
Antenna 10 118 3 1210
Monopulse Unit 67.02 88 3 6098.82
Microwave Unit 200 73 3 15200.0
Power Supply 13.55 23 3 352.3
TWT and Power Unit 76 58 3 4636
IF Preamplifier 18.09 58 3 1103.49
COHO Unite 19.45 23 3 505.7
Detector 12.36 33 3 444.96
IF Gain Control 9.7 23 3 252.3
A/D Converter 36.33 23 3 944.58
Serial Link 20.11 38 3 824.51
Monitoring Unit 13.65 23 3 354.9
Gyro Unit 113.26 43 3 5209
Stalo 181 63 3 11946
Pulse Exp/Comp 38.1 43 3 1752.6
Table Bl. Failure Rate and Repair Time of Fire Control Tracking Radar Subsystems
Partial failures not detected by BITE and 
not shutting down the system immediately 2% (Initial Start) - 8% (maximum)
Complete failure detected by the BITE and 
on the failure area exactly. 82.8%
Complete failure detected by the Bite but 
not on the failure area exactly. 9.2 %
Table B2. Failures Levels
Terms Defector Unite Module channel
New Item Cost $ 105,644.56 It varies, but < $ 9000
Cost of Repair by the 
Naval Workshops
$0 *$Q
Cost of Replacement by
the Naval Workshops
$0 » $ 0
Cost of Shipping $ 1415.59 Never shipped single
Cost of Replacement by 
Company Engineer.
$1500/engineer/day » $ Not applicable
Cost of Repair Abroad $ Up to 60% of new unit « $ Never shipped single
Table B3. Tracking Radar Detector Maintenance and Logistics Costs
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Subsystem Quantity MTTFCbrs) M TTR (brs) MTBF (hrs)
Switch 1 3.89E-02 0.00112129019 2.50E+07
Fan 1 3.16E+00 0.172792013 3.00E+05
Fan 1 3.16E+00 0.172792013 3.00E+05
Heatmg Element 1 2.84E+00 0.15566848 3.33E+05
Antenna 1 8.56E+00 1.443362916 1.00E+05
Monopulse Unit 1 5.97E+01 7.2750501 1.49E+04
Microwave Unit 1 1.82E+02 18.1315011 5.00E+03
Power Supply 1 1.31E+01 0.420245252 7.38E+04
TWT and Power Unit 1 7.05E+01 5.530107835 1.32E+04
IF Preamplifier 1 1.68E+01 1.316311194 5.53E+04
COHO Unite 1 1.88E+01 0.60323027 5.14E+04
Detector 1 1.18E+01 0.530775837 8.09E+04
IF Gain Control 1 9.40E+00 0.300839775 1.03E+05
A/D Converter 1 3.52E+01 1.126753507 2.75E+04
Serial Link 1 1.91E+01 0.983526577 4.97E+04
Monitoring Unit 1 1.32E+01 0.423346693 7.33E+04
Gyro Unit 1 1.07E+02 6.214762859 8.83E+03
Stalo 1 1.67E+02 14.24992843 5.52E+03
Pulse Exp/Comp 1 3.60E+01 2.090609791 2.62E+04
Table B4.Tracking Radar Mean Time to Failure, Mean Time to Repair, and Mean Time 
Between Failure
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APPENDIX C 
Component Stress Levels
Overall Environment -C l
General Environmental Condition K1
Ideal, static conditions 0.1
Vibration-free, controlled environment 0.5
General purpose ground based 1.0
Ship 2.0
Road 3.0
Rail 4.0
Air 10.0
Missile 100.
0
Stress Rating - C2
Percentage of component nominal rating K2
140 4.
120 0
100 2.0
80 1.0
60 0.6
40 0.3
20 0.2
0.1
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Temperature -  C3
Component temperature (degrees C) K3
0 1.0
20 1.0
40 1.3
60 2.0
80 4.0
100 10.0
120 30.0
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APPENDIX D
Analysis Expert Opinion During and After Occurrence of Partial Failures
Least k.;.y imamaa LMaaal
Midpoint t — : I m m
Most •: T.r;
Tem perature Vibration Voltage C urrent
Q -1  The amount of confidence during and after occurrence of partial failure in detector unit
Ranges I select
1 25% 50% 50% 75%
2 IM B p ii l 25% 50% 50% 75%
3 Most 25% 50% 50% 75%
0 0% 0% 0% 0%
Q -2  T ie  amount of Confidence on comparing yourself to yonr peers with respect t© expertise
Ranges I select
1 Lew than 25% 50% 50% 75%
2 the same 0% 0% 0% 0%
3 more 25% 50% 50% 75%
Q - 3 After Identifying param eters th a t cause partia l failure, estimate the two most 
important parameters that can cause partial failures.
Q- 4 At the time of occurrence of partial failure and after, estimate your confidence and
provide an estimated tolerance range in relation to average value level.
tolerance ranges f'.’l
I select Average ‘
1 0.33 0.33
2 0.67 0.67
i.e., if the expert selectd .33 of maximum average and the average is equal to + 5 volts, 
then the tolerance should read . 3 X 5  = 1.65 volts more than the normal value
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Number of Experts
Btgnges
luoufParam eters
Voltage
Vibration
Tem perature
Figure D la  Estimated Input Parameters Ranges During Occurrence of Partial Failure in 
Detector Subsystem
Number of Experts
Figure D lb Estimated Output Parameters Ranges During Occurrence of Partial Failure in
Detector Subsystem
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Number of Experts
Ranges
Voltage
Current
Vibration
Tem perature
fig u re  D ie Estimated Input Parameters Ranges After Occurrence of Partial Failure in  Detector
Subsystem
Nmnttoer of Experts
Voltage
Vibration
Tem perature
Figure D id Estimated Output Parameters Ranges After Occurrence of Partial Failure in Detector 
Subsystem
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Appendix E
Companies’ litters of evaluation, recommendations and validation
LURSSEN
L U R S S E N  L O G I S T I C S
iS r a s a n  U $ s t f e s  GmbH 
2um A K flnSpeicher11, 2875S Brem en Germany
Professor Resit Unal
Department of Engineering Management
ans System Engineering
Old Dominion University
Norfolk, Va 23509,
USA
TeHtoltfPftO*: * 49  421 6604-500 
T e U t e  * 49 421 6604-563 
TeteX 2 4 4  2 6 2 8 0 J 6
Dstumftiate
2003-06-30
DurchwaMAsxt >49421  66Q4-
190 Fax 563
UnasrZateh^ourrsfeflsnw 
<3ei Aniwort b ite  angaberv' 
plete® Quote w hen r«plywtg)
LD-Wagenzink/ki
Mr. Anwar A. Al-Jowder w orks, on developing a m ethodology to detect partial failures 
for dynamic system s to im prove perform ance, w e found as a com pany L0RSSEN LO- 
G lS n iC S  GmbH & Co. KG (Technical Department) working on the same fie ld  that 
this approach is capable to so lve die problem  o f dynam ic system s concerned. This 
m ethodology, which is developed by Mr. Al-jowder, can be also utilized to improve the 
SAT (Sea A cceptance T ests) and HAT (Harbor A cceptance T ests) standard procedures.
M oreover the observation points can be utilized and recom m ended for many dynam ic 
system s when the action o f BITE to detected and m onitored partial failures is  lagging in 
time.
L 0R SSE N  LOGISTICS 
GmbH & Co. KG
TECHNICAL DEPARTM ENT
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
108
Jana  23, 2063
Professor Resit Una I
Department of Engineering Management 
College of Engineering and Technology 
Old Dominion University 
Hampton Boulevard 
Norfolk, Virginia 23529
Dear Professor Unai:
After t h o r o u g h l y  reading the olsseitaScn of Colonel Afjowder about "Developing a 
Methodology to Detect Partial Failures for Dynamic System to .Improve Performance", I 
found a very interesting field of knowledge and integrating way of technology which 
can support any system with BITE system. The observation point suggested by Colonel 
Aijowder can give advanced detection and monitor way, especially with new integrated 
systems that Is going on a t Bahrain Royal Navy with the old systems.
Sincerely,
VSE CORPORATION 
INTERNATIONAL DIVISION
James M. Knowlton
Director
2886 Huncngls* fe e rn e  • Alexandria. Virgin;® 22303-1499 
<70319KM 690 ♦ fisx !JQS) 860-2686
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Appendix F 
Expert Input Background Evaluation
The following questionnaire and format has been adopted from the work of
Monroe (1997), Conway (2003), M&C® Productions, and the University of California
technical questionnaire for human resources. Elements to incorporate specialist judgment
new test technique have been added.
BACKGROUND
© Name or USER ID:
© DEPARTMENT: _
© WORK TITLE:___
© RANK:
© In this subject area, rate your own level o f  expertise on scale o f  1 (least) to 3 (most) ,
1=25%, 2= 50%, and 75%.
© Think o f  others with similar experience working in this discipline. On scale o f  1 (much less than
peers), to 2 (about the same), 3(much more than peers), how would you compare yourself to your peers 
with respect to expertise?_________  (Selection o f  0 % means their experience is the same).
© How many years o f  experience do you have in this area__________ .
Provide a Quantitative explanation of yonr understanding of Normal, Minimum, and 
Maximum Confidence.
The amount of Confidence or variation of record input and/or output that I associate with 
Normal Confidence is:
0% 25% 50% 75%
The amount of Confidence or variation of record input and/or output that I associate with 
M inim um  Confidence is:
0% 25% 50% 75%
The amount of Confidence or variation of record input and/or output that I associate with 
Maximum Confidence is:
0% 25% 50% 75%
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Participant Signature: 
Date
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I l l
VITA
Anwar A. Al-jowder
Colonel Staff. Anwar A. Al-jowder earned his Bachelor of Science in Electrical 
Engineering from Pakistan Naval Engineering College, Karachi in 1980. He received a 
Master of Science degree in Electrical Engineering from The Naval Postgraduate School, 
California, Monterey in 1995. His career includes 23 years with the Bahrain Royal Naval 
Force, from which he served as electrical officer onboard many ships, then as a flotilla 
electrical and electronic officer for Bahrain Naval Force. Before coming to pursue his 
doctorate in Old Dominion University, he was appointed as a Senior Commanding officer 
for major refit to all Bahrain Naval Force ships.
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